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PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE CLOUD: SOME
REALISM ABOUT TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO
TRANSNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE POSTSNOWDEN ERA†
Joris V.J. van Hoboken* and Ira S. Rubinstein**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since June 2013, the leak of thousands of classified documents regarding
highly sensitive U.S. surveillance activities by former National Security Agency
(NSA) contractor Edward Snowden has greatly intensified discussions of privacy,
trust, and freedom in relation to the use of global computing and communication
services. This is happening during a period of ongoing transition to cloud
computing services by organizations, businesses, and individuals.1 There has
always been a question inherent in this transition: are cloud services sufficiently
able to guarantee the security of their customers’ data as well as the proper
restrictions on access by third parties, including governments? While worries over
government access to data in the cloud is a predominate part of the ongoing debate
over the use of cloud services,2 the Snowden revelations highlight that intelligence
agency operations pose a unique threat to the ability of services to keep their

† The Authors would like to thank Claudia Diaz, Katherine Strandburg, Seda Gürses, Malte
Ziewitz, Nathan Newman, Heather Patterson, Elana Zeide, and the editors of the Maine Law Review for
their valuable feedback and contributions in various stages of writing this paper.
* Joris V.J. van Hoboken is a Microsoft Research Fellow at the Information Law Institute, New
York University School of Law.
** Ira S. Rubinstein is a Senior Fellow at the Information Law Institute, and Adjunct Professor,
New York University School of Law.
1. With respect to cloud services, we follow the accepted definition of cloud computing given by
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST): “a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L
INST. FOR STANDARDS & TECH, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD
COMPUTING 2 (Sept. 2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800145.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey, & Ira S. Rubinstein, Systematic Government Access
to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 195, 198-99 (2012), available at
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/195.full.pdf; Ira S. Rubinstein, Gregory T. Nojeim, & Ronald
D. Lee, Systematic Government Access to Personal Data: A Comparative Analysis, 4 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. (forthcoming 2014), available at https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/govaccess2013/governmentaccess-to-data-comparative-analysis.pdf; Joris van Hoboken, Axel Arnbak, & Nico van Eijk, Obscured
by Clouds or How to Address Governmental Access to Cloud Data from Abroad (June 7, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2276103);
Randal Milch, Thoughts on Foreign Data Storage and the Patriot Act, VERIZON POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 27,
2014), http://publicpolicy.verizon.com/blog/entry/thoughts-on-foreign-data-storage-and-the-patriot-act;
Brad Smith, Protecting Customer Data from Government Snooping, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec.
4, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12/04/protecting-customerdata-from-government-snooping.aspx.
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customers’ data out of the hands of domestic as well as foreign governments.3 The
search for a proper response is ongoing, from the perspective of market players,
governments, and civil society.
At the technical and organizational level, industry players are responding with
the wider and more sophisticated deployment of encryption as well as a new
emphasis on the use of privacy enhancing technologies and innovative architectures
for securing their services.4 These responses are the focus of this Article, which
contributes to the discussion of transnational surveillance by looking at the
interaction between the relevant legal frameworks on the one hand, and the
possible technical and organizational responses of cloud service providers to such
surveillance on the other. While the Article’s aim is to contribute to the debate
about government surveillance with respect to cloud services in particular, much of
the discussion is relevant for Internet services more broadly.
A. Transnational Surveillance
Transnational surveillance of data in the cloud presents complex scenarios that
are currently not handled in any satisfactory way by existing legal or technical
mechanisms. Of particular complexity is the question of whether and how globally
operating services can ensure that the data of an individual or organization in
‘country T’ (the targeted country) can be secured from disproportionate access by a
government agency in ‘country A’ (the accessing country). In practice, many
scenarios are even more complex, given there may be agencies in multiple
countries seeking access to data of a particular organization, data that could be
3. See infra Parts I.B., III.
4. See, e.g., Matthew Taylor, NSA Revelations ‘Changing How Businesses Store Sensitive Data’,
THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/31/data-storage-nsarevelations-businesses-snowden; Nicole Perlroth, A Call for a Highly Encrypted Future, N.Y. TIMES
BITS BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/a-call-for-a-highlyencrypted-future; Jon Fingas, FreedomPop's New Smartphone Keeps Your Calls and Data Private for
$189, ENGADGET (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/03/05/freedompopprivacy-phone; Loek Essers, KPN Strikes Deal with Silent Circle to Offer Encrypted Phone Calls,
PCWORLD (Feb. 19, 2014, 3:15 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2099160/kpn-strikes-deal-withsilent-circle-to-offer-encrypted-phone-calls.html; David Meyer, Meet Blackphone, A Privacy-Centric
Handset from Some Serious Security Veterans, GIGAOM (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:21 AM),
http://gigaom.com/2014/01/15/meet-blackphone-a-security-centric-handset-from-some-seriousencryption-veterans; Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Twitter Toughening Its Security to Thwart
Government
Snoops,
N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(Nov.
22,
2013,
4:22
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/twitter-toughening-its-security-to-thwart-governmentsnoops/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Sean Gallagher, Googlers say “F*** You” to NSA, Company
Encrypts Internal Network, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 6, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
information-technology/2013/11/googlers-say-f-you-to-nsa-company-encrypts-internal-network; Claire
Cain Miller, Angry Over U.S. Surveillance, Tech Giants Bolster Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-techgiants-bolster-defenses.html; Kurt Opsahl, 6 Steps Silicon Valley Can Take to Protect Users from NSA
Spying, CNET (Oct. 30, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57610139-38/6-stepssilicon-valley-can-take-to-protect-users-from-nsa-spying; Adrianne Jeffries, Escape from PRISM: How
Twitter Defies Government Data-Sharing, THE VERGE (Jun. 13, 2013, 1:18 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/13/4426420/twitter-prism-alex-macgillivray-NSA-government.
See
also Smith, supra note 2.

490

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

stored and transmitted across multiple international locations.
It is well established that lawful access frameworks in different jurisdictions
permit—to varying extents—transnational access to cloud data.5 The use of
transnational surveillance by foreign governments to access international data
outside the terms of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties is generally considered
problematic from a legal perspective.6 In Europe, the discussion has taken place
with a particular reference to the USA PATRIOT Act and other U.S. lawful access
authorities with possible extraterritorial effect.7 Notably, research has shown that
the extraterritorial application of such laws is not necessarily unique to the U.S.;
rather, the U.S. occupies a unique position due to the global strength of U.S. cloud
services.8
The question of transnational surveillance is of special interest for a number of
reasons. First, it is likely that individuals, businesses, and organizations want to
minimize foreign government access to their data.9 Second, it has become clear
that certain States may impose legal requirements on cloud services aimed at
preventing such access from taking place. Examples of this include discussions
about “localization” (i.e., requiring that services locate their operations inside the
country where the service is offered and/or provide local storage of data) in Europe
and Brazil, and the debate about the revision of the European data protection

5. See, e.g., Rubinstein et al., supra note 2, at 43 (noting that “[a]s Internet-based services have
become globalized, trans-border surveillance—surveillance in one country affecting citizens of
another—has flourished”).
6. See, e.g., IAN BROWN & DOUWE KORFF, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, DIGITAL FREEDOMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRACTICAL STEPS TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE (2012), available at
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Digital%20Freedoms%20in%20International%20La
w_0.pdf.
7. See, e.g., CASPAR BOWDEN, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF.,
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.p
df; DIDIER BIGO ET AL., EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF., FIGHTING
CYBER CRIME AND PROTECTING PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD (2012), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=790
50; Judith Rauhofer & Caspar Bowden, Protecting Their Own: Fundamental Rights Implications for EU
Data Sovereignty in the Cloud (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2013/28, 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283175; Zack Whittacker, Patriot Act
Can "Obtain" Data in Europe, Researchers Say, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 5:19 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57556674/patriot-act-can-obtain-data-in-europe-researcherssay. The EU data protection framework as it relates to trans-border data flows to the United States also
plays an important role in this discussion. See Memorandum 13/1059 from the Eur. Comm’n on
Restoring Trust in EU-US Data Flows (Nov. 27, 2013) (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-13-1059_en.htm).
8. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 2, at 43. For some comparative data, see also WINSTON
MAXWELL & CHRISTOPHER WOLF, HOGAN LOVELLS, A GLOBAL REALITY: GOVERNMENTAL ACCESS
TO DATA IN THE CLOUD (2012), available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/uploads/file/
Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%20Data%20Paper%20(18%20July%2012).pdf.
9. See, e.g., EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD COMPUTING 45-46 (Daniele Catteddu
& Giles Hogben eds., 2009), available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/riskmanagement/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment.
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framework.10 Third, fundamental questions remain and are the subject of official
review, such as through the President’s Review Group,11 as to the appropriate
standards and related safeguards for lawful access to data of foreign organizations
and individuals.12 Finally, it seems likely that cross border markets and flows of
data will continue to grow and intensify in light of the technology and market
dynamics underlying cloud computing services. Thus, the challenges for the cloud
industry facing these unresolved issues of transnational cloud surveillance are
substantial.
B. A Cloud Industry Under Threat
If anything, the Snowden leaks clearly illustrate that global cloud service
providers are facing a new class of threats from intelligence agencies across the
world. The revelations are many and diverse in nature. This Article proposes that,
from the perspective of the cloud industry, the threats can be generally
distinguished in terms of front-door versus backdoor access to data and
communications handled by cloud providers. Revelations of front-door access in
the U.S. context include PRISM and the widely discussed telephone metadata
program.13 The PRISM program is conducted on the basis of Section 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act 2008 (FAA), under which the U.S. intelligence community
has successfully gained access to data from U.S. cloud services related to non-U.S.
persons reasonably believed to be outside the U.S.14 Under this program, the NSA
gains access by demanding cloud and communication service providers hand over
customer information and content, requiring annual certification, and with targeting
and minimization procedures reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.15 What is most striking about these programs is the structural basis and
scale on which access takes place. In addition, many have raised doubts about the
statutory and constitutional basis of these programs under U.S., international, as
well as foreign law.16 Observers and stakeholders from outside of the United States
10. See, e.g., Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2, at 25-32; Ian Traynor, New EU Rules to Curb
Transfer of Data to U.S. After Edward Snowden Revelations, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 2013, 10:13
EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden; Jefferson
Ribeiro, Bill Would Allow Brazil to Decree Local Internet Data Storage, REUTERS (Nov. 5th, 2013, 3:34
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/net-us-brazil-internet-idUSBRE9A30SI20131105.
11. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMM’CN TECH., LIBERTY AND SECURITY
IN A CHANGING WORLD 153 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter REVIEW GROUP REPORT].
12. One such question is the territorial application of the privacy guarantees of certain human rights
treaties. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/usseems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions-abroad.html.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See id.
15. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE REPORT:
NSA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702, at 2-3 (Apr. 16,
2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf
[hereinafter NSA FISA REPORT].
16. For a discussion of legal issues related to Section 702 as the basis for programs like PRISM, see
Jennifer Granick, Reforming the Section 702 Dragnet (Part 1), JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:24 PM)
http://justsecurity.org/2014/01/30/reforming-section-702-dragnet-1. See generally, Rubinstein et al.,
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are especially troubled by the fact that Section 702 would clearly violate the Fourth
Amendment if it were designed to intercept the communications of U.S. persons.17
Even more worrying from an industry perspective is that intelligence agencies
have begun to gain backdoor access to the data handled by cloud providers.
Backdoor access dispenses with serving orders on cloud providers or otherwise
notifying them or seeking their cooperation.18 Reports about a variety of U.S. and
British programs show how the intelligence community has systematically sought
such backdoor access to data outside of the knowledge of cloud providers. For
example, a program known as MUSCULAR apparently enables the NSA to
intercept the unencrypted data traffic between cloud provider data centers.19
Similarly, the UPSTREAM program, details of which were revealed in
combination with the revelations about PRISM, showed that the NSA was gaining
sweeping access to Internet communications through the targeting of the
telecommunications infrastructure.20
Additionally, the BULLRUN program
supra note 2; Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2. The Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to Section
702 in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (holding that respondents lacked standing
to challenge Section 702). However, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which
is a board created by Congress to review and analyze executive branch anti-terrorism efforts and ensure
that they are balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties, see generally PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., http://www.pclob.gov (last visited Apr. 21, 2014), recently issued a
report in which it concluded that the metadata program was illegal under U.S. law. See PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOBReport-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf. The PCLOB is currently conducting a similar study of
Section 702. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/MeetingsEvents/2014-March-19-Public-Hearing/19-March-2014_Public_Hearing_Transcript.pdf.
17. See REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at 153 (“If Section 702 were designed to intercept
the communications of United States persons, it would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.”). See
also REPORT ON THE FINDINGS BY THE EU CO-CHAIRS OF THE AD HOC EU-US WORKING GROUP ON
DATA PROTECTION (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findingsof-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf (“US persons benefit from constitutional
protections (respectively, First and Fourth Amendments) that do not apply to EU citizens not residing in
the U.S.”); COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE & HOME AFFAIRS, EUR. PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT
ON THE U.S. NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME, SURVEILLANCE BODIES IN VARIOUS MEMBER STATES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND ON TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
IN
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, 2013/2188(INI) (Jan. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/moraes_1014703_/moraes_101
4703_en.pdf [hereinafter LIBE COMMITTEE DRAFT REPORT]; David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA
Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/29/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights; Office of the Press Sec’y, The White
House, Presidential Policy Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2014)
(available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014sigint.mem_.ppd_.rel_.pdf)
(recognizing “the legitimate privacy and civil liberties concerns of . . .citizens of other nations,” while
not extending the same protections to them as available for U.S. persons).
18. For the purposes of our discussion, backdoor access also covers processes that may be better
characterized as involving side-door access to data. See also infra note 20 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text. See also infra Part III.B.2.
20. See infra notes 112-113 and Part III.B.1 for further discussion of UPSTREAM. This Article
categorizes access to cloud data through the telecommunications infrastructure as backdoor access
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showed how the NSA had systematically undermined encryption and security in
available commercial systems through a variety of covert methods.21 These
methods include the undermining of encryption standards, the covert influence of
software design, and the pressuring of industry and firms to hand over encryption
keys, thereby allowing for circumvention of security measures more generally.22
Leaked documents suggest that these programs are conducted pursuant to Section
702 of the FAA as well as Executive Order 12333.23 The latter sets guidelines for
intelligence activities including foreign intelligence gathering conducted abroad,
but does not involve any judicial or congressional oversight.24
C. The Cloud Industry Responds While Being Caught in the Middle
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, the revelations involving
backdoor access have led to the strongest industry response. Most fundamentally,
backdoor access programs have forced cloud providers to rethink their relationship
with (their own and foreign) governments and to take steps designed to prevent
intelligence agencies from gaining unauthorized access to their systems.25 In other
words, when cloud providers implement security measures against unauthorized
access, they are forced to consider intelligence agencies as just another third-party
adversary whose access they must block.26 The main difference is one of resources
and skills: as compared with any other adversary, intelligence agencies have worldclass technology and expertise and seemingly unlimited budgets. Furthermore,
cooperation among allied agencies with similar capabilities acts as a force
multiplier, as is the case with the “Five Eyes,” consisting of the U.S., the U.K.,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.27
The international political response to the revelations of large scale

because the interception takes place through the targeting of a third party other than the cloud provider,
notwithstanding the fact that the intelligence community follows legal processes with respect to the
telecommunications providers.
21. For information on the BULLRUN program, see infra note 114-116 and accompanying text.
22. See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/
nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html (discussing documents which detail that the N.S.A. spends
more than $250 million a year on its Sigint Enabling Project, which “actively engages the U.S. and
foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their commercial products’ designs”
to make them “exploitable”). See also infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
23. Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
24. See infra notes 152-153.
25. See infra Part III.B.2 for a detailed discussion.
26. See Smith, supra note 2.
27. The Five Eyes collaboration is based on the UKUSA agreements. See UKUSA Agreement
Release 1940-1956, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (June 24, 2010), http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/
declass/ukusa.shtml. See generally JEFFERY T. RICHELSON, THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 347372 (6th ed. 2012). Many of the programs revealed by Snowden involved cooperation between the NSA
and the British intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). See Nick
Hopkins & Julian Borger, Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, THE GUARDIAN,
August 1, 2013, 11:04 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spyingedward-snowden.
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transnational surveillance has been significant.28 Foreign governments, such as
Germany and Brazil, have not only sought clarifications from the U.S. but have
also started to propose regulatory measures designed to counter it.29 In the EUU.S. context, the revelations have complicated ongoing trade negotiations,30
imperiled the Safe Harbor Program,31 and emboldened the European Parliament to
adopt poison pill amendments to the proposed EU data protection regulation.32 In
the broader international context, Brazil has been particularly vocal about its
objections to U.S. spying and, with Germany, sponsored a new United Nations
resolution requiring a report on the protection and promotion of privacy “in the
context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance . . . including on a mass
scale.”33 Moreover, the U.S. now faces significantly more opposition to its
historically dominant position in Internet governance.34
In addition, market conditions for U.S. cloud providers have deteriorated as a
28. For an overview of responses, see DAVID WRIGHT & REINHARD KREISSL, EUROPEAN
RESPONSES TO THE SNOWDEN REVELATIONS: A DISCUSSION PAPER, (2013), available at
http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IRISS_European-responses-to-the-Snowdenrevelations_18-Dec-2013_Final.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Alison Smale, Merkel Backs Plan to Keep European Data in Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2014, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/world/europe/merkel-backsplan-to-keep-european-data-in-europe.html; H. E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic
of Brazil, Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013) (transcript available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/
default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf).
30. See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin, Snooping Claims Add New Complication to Tough EU-US Trade
Talks, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82026644-e1a1-11e2-b79600144feabdc0.html#axzz2ytFYLEMd; Press Release, Eur. Parliament, NSA Snooping: MEPs Table
Proposals
to
Protect
EU
Citizens'
Privacy
(Feb.
12,
2014)
(available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bIMPRESS%2b20140210IPR35501%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN)
(“The
European Parliament should withhold its consent to an EU-US trade deal unless it fully respects EU
citizens’ data privacy.”).
31. See WRIGHT & KREISSL, supra note 28, at 18-19.
32. See Traynor, supra note 10. In particular, Compromise Amendment Article 43a of the
European Parliament establishes a regime of oversight of European Data Protection Authorities over
government access requests abroad. See Compromise Amendments on Articles 30-91, Proposal For a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individual with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection),
COM(2012)0011–C7
0025/2012–2012/0011(COD)
(Oct.
17,
2013),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_3091/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf.
33. See Peter James Spielmann, UN Advances Internet Privacy Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov.
26, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-advances-Internet-privacy-rights.
34. See, e.g., MILTON MUELLER & BEN WAGNER, FINDING A FORMULA FOR BRAZIL:
REPRESENTATION AND LEGITIMACY IN INTERNET GOVERNANCE (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.Internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/MiltonBenWPdraft_Final.pdf;
Milton Mueller, Do the NSA Revelations Have Anything to Do With Internet Governance?, THE
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.Internetgovernance.org/2014/02/19/dothe-nsa-revelations-have-anything-to-do-with-Internet-governance. See also Press Release, Internet
Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers, Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation
(Oct. 7, 2013) (available at https://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-07oct13en.htm).
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result of new doubts about the security and privacy of cloud data. The revelations
have also dealt a significant blow to the reputation of major Internet industry
players, which have seen their brands implicated in the reporting about NSA spying
programs.35 Cloud customers expect providers to reassure them that their data is
safe and that firms are taking active steps to respond to these new threats. The U.S.
cloud industry not only feels besieged by government agencies seeking access to
their systems left and right, but rightly worries that its overseas revenues will dry
up due to customer mistrust or new restrictions on market entry.36 Although the
increased emphasis on localization rules and requirements in foreign jurisdictions
may smack of protectionism and local government surveillance demands,37 it
further complicates the geopolitical situation facing the U.S. industry.
And yet, despite the difficulty and complexity of these issues, doing nothing is
simply not an option for cloud providers operating in international markets. Thus,
leading cloud firms have been thrust into legal and policy debates concerning
transnational surveillance, both in the U.S. and abroad.38 In the policy context,
industry has pushed with some success for more transparency about cloud
surveillance, arguing that “transparency is essential to a debate over governments’
surveillance powers and the scope of programs that are administered under those
powers.”39 In particular, industry players have joined calls for new international
35. See, e.g., Richard Waters, Cisco Cites Emerging Markets Backlash on NSA Leaks for Sales
Slump, FT.COM (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/445c67ce-4cb1-11e3-958f00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ytFYLEMd; Cyber Risk Report: September 9-15 2013, CISCO (Sept. 16, 2013,
7:36 PM), http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewCrr.x?alertId=30820.
36. See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? 3 (Aug. 2013), available at http://www2.itif.org/2013cloud-computing-costs.pdf (estimating losses of $35 billion for the U.S. cloud industry by 2016); Claire
Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-lineof-tech-companies.html (discussing a variety of ways in which U.S industry is negatively affected in
foreign sales in the cloud market); James Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects,
FORRESTER (Aug. 14, 2013), http://blogs.forrester.com/james_staten/13-08-14-the_cost_of_prism_
will_be_larger_than_itif_projects (estimating the costs to be as high as $180 billion). For further
discussion on this topic, see REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at 212. See also Antonia
Blumberg, Brazil Chooses Saab Jet Deal For Air Force After NSA Spying Sours Boeing Bid,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/18/brazil-saabjet-deal_n_4469386.html; Richard Waters, Cisco Cites Emerging Markets Backlash on NSA Leaks for
Sales Slump, FT.COM (Nov. 13 2013, 10:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/445c67ce-4cb1-11e3958f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ytFYLEMdhttp://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/445c67ce-4cb1-11e3-958f00144feabdc0.html; Anton Troianovski et al., NSA Fallout Thwarts AT&T, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 30,
2013), at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/print/WSJ_-B00120131101.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Michael Scaturro, The Quest to Build an NSA-Proof Cloud, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 21,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/11/the-quest-to-build-an-nsaproof-cloud/281704 (discussing plans of European leaders to push for a European cloud in the face of
Snowden revelations and U.S. dominance in the cloud industry).
38. See REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, http://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014). See also Spencer Ackerman, Tech Giants Reach White House Deal on NSA
Surveillance of Customer Data, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 27, 2014, 18:34 EST,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tech-giants-white-house-deal-surveillance-customerdata.
39. See REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, supra note 38.
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agreements and argued for legal reforms domestically.40 As previously mentioned,
and discussed in more depth in Part III, at the technical and organizational level,
industry players are responding with the deployment of encryption measures to
safeguard their customers’ data and there is an increased emphasis on the use of
privacy enhancing technologies and innovative architectures for securing their
services.
Apparently, the methods of the intelligence community and new requirements
that the industry faces abroad may force industry players to adopt new measures
that could impact the balance of power between intelligence agencies and their
targets. While in the past, firms may have considered certain security and
encryption measures too costly or inconvenient to implement, under the postSnowden calculus, they are now adopting them as a matter of business necessity.
This is a sea change and also raises the question of whether and to what extent the
intelligence community in the U.S. has the legal means and authority to counteract
the pervasive use of measures aimed at restricting lawful access to data.
As noted, this Article contributes to the policy debates regarding transnational
surveillance by looking at the possible technical and organizational responses of
service providers to such surveillance and their interaction with the relevant legal
frameworks. A policy solution to the problems of transnational surveillance is still
absent and may require a significant overhaul of an international agreement on the
legal frameworks for lawful access of data relating to individuals and organizations
in the U.S. and abroad.41 In the meantime, affected industry players have started to
explore solutions in the organizational and technical design of their services.
In addition, the Article explores a related and timely issue, namely, whether
existing legal authorities enable the intelligence community to prevent, limit, or
modify these industry responses consistent with its intelligence gathering mission.
This Article suggests that, even though the current framework allows for some
governmental counter measures based on technical assistance provisions and other
means, the answer to this question is generally negative. It follows that, if the
intelligence community wishes to block or reverse heightened and properly
implemented security solutions, it will need to obtain new legal authority from the
U.S. Congress. A look into past precedents—such as the mid-90s debate over
encryption export controls—suggests that industry may well prevail in this next
round in the crypto wars.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides historical background
concerning the availability and implementation of strong security measures in the
commercial and international context and its impact on lawful access as well as the
way in which the legal framework for lawful access for Internet services has
developed accordingly. Part III looks at industry reactions to the Snowden
revelations by exploring several technical responses in more detail, discussing the
40. Id.
41. The likelihood of no-spying agreements between for instance the U.S. and Germany is
reportedly low. See Patrick Donahue & Arne Delfs, Merkel’s No-Spy Ambitions With U.S. May
Collapse, Envoy Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-02-13/merkel-s-no-spy-ambitions-with-u-s-may-collapse-envoy-says.html (quoting one
official in the ongoing negotiations as stating that “[t]he Americans have no interest in giving up their
sovereignty in this area”).
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motivation of these responses as well as their aim and effectiveness. Part IV
considers to what extent the U.S. intelligence community—under existing legal
authorities—can prevent, undermine, or mitigate these technical responses. This
entails an examination of several bodies of law, including the technical assistance
provisions in both the comprehensive statute regulating the gathering of foreign
intelligence,42 the omnibus law setting standards for law enforcement access to
electronic communications and associated data,43 and the law requiring telecom
carriers to design wiretap-ready equipment.44 The Article serves as a discussion of
what lessons may be learned from earlier confrontations in which industry sought
for and won relaxation of encryption export controls despite law enforcement and
national security objections. The Article concludes with a number of observations
about the future of transnational surveillance and the way in which technology and
government responses and counter measures may shape governmental access to the
cloud.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Internet Security
The early days of Internet security may be summed up in one word: neglect.
From 1969, when the U.S. government established the ARPAnet with four
geographically distributed computers communicating with each other using packet
switching techniques,45 until the early 1980s, when the ARPAnet migrated to
TCP/IP as its basic communication protocol,46 this “network of networks” lacked
any formal security mechanisms and relied instead on social norms and
reputational sanctions to ensure good behavior.47 TCP/IP lacked a security layer
thereby leaving Internet traffic vulnerable to a range of attacks including spoofing,
intrusion, and denial of service.48 It was not until 1992 that the Internet
42. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, & 50 of the United States Code).
43. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012))
44. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010).
45. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (2000).
46. TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) is the basic communication language
or protocol of the Internet. It was co-invented by Robert E. Kahn and Vinton Cerf. See generally
JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN APPROACH (5th ed.
2009).
47. SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SECURITY 451-52
(2d ed. 1996) (“In the early days of the ARPANET, . . . [s]ecurity problems were rare: if somebody on
the network was disruptive, tracking him down and having him disciplined was a simple matter. In
extreme cases, people could lose their network privileges, or even their job . . . . In many ways, the
Internet was a large private club. These days the internet is not so exclusive. The Internet has grown so
large that you can almost never determine the identity of somebody who is breaking into your system . .
. .”).
48. See, e.g., Bob Metcalfe, Arpa Network Working Grp., RFC 602: The Stockings Were Hung by
the Chimney with Care (1973) reprinted in SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY
AND COMMERCE 79 (2d ed. 2002) (identifying three security problems in the early days of the Internet:
lack of security against remote access; unauthorized people using the net; and hackers breaking into

498

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

Engineering Task Force (IETF) began to seriously consider what needed to be done
to secure the Internet.49
By the mid-90s, the ARPAnet had split into a separate (and more secure)
military network and a network of scientific and academic computers funded by the
National Science Foundation (NSF), called NSFnet.50 In 1995, NSF completed a
phased withdrawal to turn over this non-military network to a consortium of
commercial providers, creating the predecessor to the Internet.51 In the early 90s,
Tim Berners-Lee and his colleagues at CERN were inventing the World Wide
Web.52 A short time later, Netscape released the first commercial web browser
with a graphical use interface,53 and the general public began using the Internet and
browsing the Web in ever increasing numbers.54
As the Internet changed and Internet service providers (ISPs) began offering
net access as a service to the public, the level of concern regarding Internet security
(and privacy) changed with it. As Vinton Cerf later observed, security and privacy
concerns emerged when “the community of users grew from a fairly homogeneous
cohort linked by common research interests to a highly heterogeneous, globally
distributed population.”55 For example, when ISPs began charging members of the
public who wanted to “go online,” they had an obvious reason to worry about
authentication, because they needed to verify which customers were paying for
their services. Moreover, ISPs could not rely on the informal norms of “netiquette”
to police their networks; they were offering a commercial service to the public and,
therefore, had to take steps to protect their service against the growing menace of
network attacks, malware, spam, and password theft.
More generally, the promise of the Internet for transforming the world of
commerce, communication, and other domains of societal activity would require an
increased focus on security. Thus, pioneering Internet firms like Netscape had a
machines and crashing them). See also Steven Bellovin, Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol
Suite, 19 COMPUTER COMM. REV. 32 (1989) (analyzing the technical basis for these problems).
49. For an early discussion of Internet Protocol Security (i.e., the protocol suite for securing and
encrypting Internet communications), see RANDALL ATKINSON, SIPP ENCAPSULATING SECURITY
PAYLOAD (1993); see also Randall Atkinson, Naval Research Lab., RFC 1825: Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol (Aug. 1995) (available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1825.pdf).
50. See ABBATE, supra note 45, at 185.
51. See id. at 194-99.
52. Berns-Lee and his colleagues developed the initial versions of HTML (Hypertext Markup
Language), HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol), and a Web server and browser. See KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 257 (1998).
53. Id. (discussing the first graphical Web browser known as Mosaic).
54. See, e.g., K.G. COFFMAN & A.M. ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS—RESEARCH, THE SIZE AND GROWTH
RATE OF THE INTERNET (1998), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.size.pdf.
55. Vinton Cerf, Foreword to PETER H. SALUS, CASTING THE NET: FROM ARPANET TO INTERNET
AND BEYOND, at ix (1995). Like Vinton Cerf, Robert Kahn acknowledges the early neglect of security
but for a different reason:
It was only many years later when the net became really a public utility of sorts that
[dangers, such as viruses, fraud or identity theft] started to show up. We were not really
thinking about the dangers of that and perhaps we should have done. I wish we had spent
more time on that, but again, in the context of what we were doing, we might not have
actually got the project off the ground.
Robert Kahn, Getting the Net Off the Ground, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/
click_online/4317521.stm (last updated Mar. 4, 2005, 5:23 PM).
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strong business incentive to develop new security protocols that would make the
Internet safe for commercial transactions.56 In 1995, Netscape released an early
version of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, which underlies secure
browsing and soon became “the most widely deployed cryptographic system in the
world.”57 SSL and its successor, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard, are
designed to provide communication security over the Internet using a technique
known as public-key cryptography to exchange a symmetric encryption key, which
encrypts the data flowing between a browser and a web server.58 TLS/SSL
prevents both eavesdropping and tampering, thereby making it possible for the
general public to go online safely for e-commerce, online banking, and other uses
of the Internet that warrant security, privacy, and confidentiality.59 By building
TLS/SSL support into its browsers, Netscape (and later all other browser vendors)
ensured that the general public could automatically benefit from the significant new
developments in cryptography.
As the next Section suggests, however, industry’s somewhat belated efforts to
secure the Internet clashed with the equally powerful needs of government
agencies. For example, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
NSA were determined to ensure ongoing access to information and
communications over the Internet. The FBI routinely seeks access to information
and communications to conduct investigations and gather evidence for criminal
prosecutions.60 The NSA, on the other hand, has both an information assurance
mission, “preventing foreign adversaries from gaining access to sensitive or
classified national security information,” and a signals intelligence (“sigint”)
mission for which it “collects, processes, and disseminates intelligence information
from foreign signals for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes and to
support military operations.”61
In the mid-90’s, industry and government clashed in particular over export
controls on encryption. The industry argued that the development and sale of
popular U.S. software products with strong encryption capabilities should move
forward without regulatory constraints, both to protect the nations’ vulnerable
information infrastructure and to ensure the success of a vital industry that

56. See Denise Caruso, Netscape's Decision to Give Away Code Could Alter the Software Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/02/business/technology-digital-commercenetscape-s-decision-give-away-code-could-alter.html (describing Netscape’s decision to give away its
browser for free while charging for its server software).
57. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING
AND ENCRYPTION 52 (2007).
58. The TLS/SSL protocol enables the communicating parties over the Internet to reliably and
securely agree on an encryption standard, before actually communicating their respective messages. For
the SSL standards, see The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0, INTERNET ENG’G TASK
FORCE (Aug. 2011), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101. For the TLS protocol, see The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF TOOLS (Aug. 2008), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246.
59. IETF TOOLS, supra note 58.
60. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 81-94 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter CRISIS
REPORT].
61. Mission, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last updated
Apr. 15, 2011); see also CRISIS REPORT, supra note 60, at 94-102.
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depended on foreign sales for more than half of its revenues.62 Law enforcement
and intelligence officials insisted that some level of export (and possibly even
domestic) controls on encryption were necessary to protect their legitimate
interests.63 Thus began the crypto wars.64
B. The Crypto Wars
Cryptography encompasses the use of codes and ciphers to protect valuable or
sensitive information from disclosure to unauthorized third parties.65 Until the
1970s, cryptography was the preserve of the military, foreign diplomats, and
spies.66 Over the next several decades, and thanks to the invention of public-key
cryptography by academic researchers working outside the military sphere,
cryptography gradually moved into the mainstream of computer technology and
electronic commerce.67 As the Internet became a mainstream communications,
media, commercial, political and social tool for individuals, businesses, and
governments, software companies and service providers turned to encryption for a
variety of security needs. Encryption-based security solutions helped to protect
electronic funds transfers, guard proprietary and other sensitive information
(including digital content such as books, film, and music), and ensure the privacy
and security of personal and business records and communications.68
By the early 90’s, U.S. software vendors, responding to customer demand for
greater security, added encryption functionality to then popular messaging and
network programs.69 At the same time, independent developers like Phil
Zimmermann developed Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a program for protecting the
privacy of email using the latest developments in public-key cryptography.70 By
the middle of the decade, Netscape and Microsoft had both added support for SSL
to their popular Internet browser and server products, which they wished to
distribute both in the U.S. and abroad.71 Under the State Department’s
interpretations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the export
of strong cryptographic products was illegal unless the exporter succeeded in the
cumbersome process of obtaining a munitions license.72 In contrast, the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by the Commerce Department,
granted general licenses for exports of mass-market software provided that the

62. See Ira S. Rubinstein & Michael D. Hintze, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2000, 812 PLI/Comm 505 (Evan R. Berlack & Cecil Hunt eds., 2000),
available at http://encryption_policies.tripod.com/us/rubinstein_1200_software.htm.
63. Id.
64. See generally STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENTSAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2001).
65. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 11-14.
66. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 60, at 53.
67. See, e.g., id. at 364-95, 414-20.
68. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 47-52.
69. Rubinstein & Hintze, supra note 62.
70. Zimmermann released PGP to the Internet, which made it available overseas in apparent
violation of U.S. export controls. See LEVY, supra note 64, at 287-88.
71. Rubinstein & Hintze, supra note 62.
72. Id.
WITH
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software programs had somewhat weaker encryption capabilities.73
In light of these regulatory hurdles, the U.S. tech industry began lobbying
Congress and the Commerce Department to relax export controls on mass-market
software with encryption capabilities, arguing that such controls were both
ineffective (due to foreign availability of similar products) and harmful to U.S.
industry’s competitiveness in worldwide markets.74 Both the FBI and the NSA
countered that the broad dissemination of encryption products would become a
major hindrance to their respective missions: strong encryption would prevent them
from understanding messages they acquired through surveillance or other means,
while even weak encryption, if used on a regular basis, would increase the cost of
acquisition and analysis.75
Faced with these conflicting viewpoints and arguments, the Clinton
Administration sought a middle ground. On April 16, 1993, it announced a NSAdesigned, tamper-proof encryption chip (the “Clipper” chip) together with a splitkey approach to escrowing keys.76 More specifically, the Clipper chip used a
classified secure algorithm for encryption.77 Each chip also contained a unique key
that was split into two parts at the time of manufacture for deposit with two U.S.
government escrow agents, which would provide them to law-enforcement
agencies upon presentation of a valid court order.78 By combining strong security
with a key escrow system, the Clinton Administration hoped to balance the
competing demands of industry and individuals for highly secure communications,
with the needs of law-enforcement agencies.79 Moreover, the Administration
promised that devices incorporating the Clipper chip would be exportable to most
countries.80
The software Industry rejected the key escrow initiative out of hand, arguing
that customer demand for escrowed encryption was lacking and that all such
systems were inherently less secure, more costly, and more difficult to use than
non-escrowed encryption system.81 In addition, they argued that the whole idea of
a key escrow with U.S.-based or U.S.-approved escrow agents was a non-starter in
international markets.82 Over the next several years, the Administration sought to
address industry concerns by experimenting with successive versions of the keyescrow program but to no avail.83 Rather, a broad coalition of software, hardware,
Internet, and telecom companies, trade associations, and public interest groups
continued to pursue a multi-pronged effort to liberalize export controls, while

73. For a general description of U.S. export controls on encryption software during this period, see
id.
74. Id.
75. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 60, at 101.
76. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Apr. 16, 1993) (available at
http://epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statement_4_93.html).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Rubinstein & Hintze, supra note 62.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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opposing mandatory key escrow requirements.84 During this time, the industry
coalition and the Administration turned to Congress for a solution and while House
and Senate committees debated and approved several bills, Congress did not enact
any encryption legislation.85 Finally, on September 16, 1999, in the midst of the
Gore-Bush presidential campaign, the White House announced a major
liberalization of U.S. encryption controls that permitted the export of mass-market
software with strong encryption capabilities to non-governmental users in most
countries (other than those subject to an embargo) as well as other regulatory
changes.86 Clearly, the government backed down in this round of the crypto
wars.87
But the Administration had already won an important battle earlier in the
crypto wars. In 1992, responding to the growing complexity of the telecom
industry and the transition to digital switches, the FBI put forth what it called the
Digital Telephony Proposal, which would require telecommunications providers to
help facilitate government interceptions of wire and electronic communications.88
Two years later, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) despite industry objections based on costs, loss of
privacy, and loss of industry control over the design of its services.89 Notably,
Silicon Valley firms won an important concession: CALEA requirements would
apply only to telecommunication services or facilities that enable a subscriber to
make, receive, or direct calls, and not to “information services” such as e-mail
providers and ISPs.90 In recent years, the FBI has sought to expand CALEA to
Internet services, arguing that the original legislative carve out created a gap
between its legal authority and the capabilities of Internet services to comply with
wiretap and related orders in a timely and efficient manner, a problem it refers to as
“Going Dark.”91 In 2010, the FBI first floated a proposal, dubbed CALEA II, that
would extend the technical design mandates of CALEA to a broad range of Internet
communications services.92 Given the controversial nature of the Snowden
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over
Cryptographic Key “Escrow,” 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15 (1996); DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57;
LEVY, supra note 64.
88. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 205-206.
89. Id.
90. See infra Part IV.A.
91. See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 10 (2011) (prepared statement of Valerie Caproni, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
92. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html (“[O]fficials want
Congress to require all services that enable communications—including encrypted e-mail transmitters
like BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct ‘peer to
peer’ messaging like Skype—to be technically capable of complying if served with a wiretap order.”).
As recently as last spring, the FBI renewed its proposal for a so-called “CALEA II.” See Charlie
Savage, U.S. Weighing Wide Overhaul of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/obama-may-back-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users.html.
For a critique of CALEA II, see Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Leading Security Experts Say FBI Wiretapping
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revelations regarding NSA surveillance methods (discussed below), it seems
unlikely that the Obama Administration will have the necessary political support to
enact any bill encompassing the FBI’s CALEA II proposal.
C. Post-9/11: From Surveillance Reforms to the Snowden Revelations
The two preceding Sections demonstrate how security, encryption, and
surveillance intersected in the early history of the Internet and during the crypto
wars. They intersected again, and even more dramatically, in the period beginning
immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon and ending with the Snowden revelations and their
aftermath. Seven weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed a new law greatly
expanding the government’s electronic surveillance powers under FISA, ECPA,
and other surveillance laws: the USA PATRIOT Act.93 Among other things, this
act added a broad new definition of terrorism, authorized delayed notice of search
warrants, expanded the definition of pen registers, authorized “roving” wiretaps,
and permitted FISA applications even where foreign intelligence gathering was not
the primary purpose of the investigation (as long as it was a “significant
purpose”).94 In addition, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act added a new
provision to FISA authorizing the bulk collection and querying of telephone
records.95
In 2005, The New York Times reported that President Bush had issued
executive orders, as part of a surveillance program entitled the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP), authorizing the NSA to conduct warrantless
surveillance of telephone calls and emails from the U.S. to recipients abroad.96 Not
surprisingly, multiple lawsuits and Congressional hearings ensued, challenging the
legal validity of TSP and seeking reforms of FISA.97 In order to immunize the
telephone companies that had cooperated with the NSA against liability and
provide a legal foundation for intercepting communications where one party was
located outside the U.S. and another party inside the U.S., Congress revisited FISA
in 2007 and again in 2008.98 The second revision significantly broadened the
Proposal Would Undermine Cybersecurity, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 17, 2013),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/joseph-lorenzo-hall/1705leading-security-experts-say-fbi-wiretappingproposal-would-undermine-cybersecurity.
93. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
mainly in scattered sections of Titles 8, 18, 28, 42, 49 & 50 of the United States Code). See also the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat.
3638, 3742 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012)) (creating FISA surveillance authority to target
unaffiliated foreign persons who may pose terrorist threats).
94. For an overview of the USA PATRIOT Act, see Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After
the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003).
95. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2012).
96. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/politics/15cndprogram.html?pagewanted=all.
97. See generally G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59
LOY. L. REV. 861 (2014).
98. Id. at 934-35.
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government’s power to engage in foreign surveillance.99 In particular, Section 702
of the FAA authorized senior government officials to target the electronic
communications of persons “reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States” 100 without having to establish probable cause or seek the approval of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)101 of its decisions about which
individuals to target, even if the interception takes place inside the United States.102
Rather, Section 702 authorizes the FISC to approve annual certifications submitted
by senior officials that identify certain categories of foreign intelligence targets
whose communications may be collected, subject to FISC-approved targeting and
minimization procedures.103
On June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian broke the first of many
stories involving the “Snowden revelations.”104 The leaks revealed—and continue
to reveal—that multiple U.S. government collection and surveillance programs are
seemingly beyond the scope of Sections 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and 702 of
the FAA. The first article described an NSA program to collect millions of calling
records of U.S. customers of Verizon, regardless of whether they are suspected of
any wrongdoing. This program involved the government collection of “telephony
metadata” (but not the content of phone calls) on an ongoing basis, subject to the
terms of a court order pursuant to Section 215.105 The next day, The Guardian
reported on another NSA program referred to in the leaked documents as
“PRISM,” under which the government collects the content of electronic
communications, including “search history, the content of emails, file transfers and
live chats.”106 One of the leaked documents suggested that the government was
collecting this data directly from the servers of leading U.S. companies including
Google, Facebook, and Apple, although the government and the companies
involved have all denied such claims.107
99. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in
scattered sections of Title 50 of the United States Code).
100. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
101. See id. § 1881a(i).
102. See id. § 1881a(d).
103. See id. § 1881a(g). The FAA also authorized senior officials to issue directives requiring
electronic communications service providers to assist the government in collecting these
communications. Id. §1881a(h).
104. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2103, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order.
105. Id. “Metadata” includes communications routing information such as originating and
terminating telephone number and time and duration of call but does not include the contents of
communications. Press Release, Director of National Intelligence Statement on Recent Unauthorized
Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorizeddisclosures-of-classified-information.
106. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple,
Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/ustech-giants-nsa-data.
107. See Mark Zuckerberg, Status Update, June 7, 2013, 5:45 PM, FACEBOOK (last visited May 7,
2014), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10100828955847631; Larry Page & David Drummond,
What the ...?, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (June 7, 2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/
what.html. See also Declan McCullagh, No Evidence of NSA’s ‘Direct Access’ to Tech Companies,
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These and other Snowden revelations ignited a firestorm of criticism. The
leaks sparked what many consider a long overdue debate on the nature and extent
of the NSA’s surveillance programs and their impact on civil liberties, both in the
U.S. and abroad.108 In the view of many, the revelations also caused immediate
damage to U.S. foreign relations109 and national security.110 Additionally, the U.S.
tech industry—and especially companies in the cloud computing industry—worried
about potential spillover damage based on foreign businesses and governments
threatening not to use their services because of concerns over NSA spying.111 And
they had good reason for these concerns. Over the course of the next several
months, there were at least three additional press reports that undermined U.S.
cloud services in the eyes of foreign customers. First, in August 2013, The New
York Times described another program conducted under Section 702 in which the
NSA acquires communications by “systematically searching—without warrants—
through the contents of Americans’ communications that cross the border . . .
temporarily copying and then sifting through the contents of what is apparently
most [international] e-mails and other text-based communications.”112 This is
sometimes referred to as upstream collection, because it apparently involves realtime interception of communications as they pass through fiber cables or other
major data pipelines.113
A month later, The New York Times reported that the NSA has been engaged in
and winning a “secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery,
court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools
protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age.”114 This
program, which the leaked documents refer to as BULLRUN,115 is especially
significant for present purposes because it reveals how NSA overcame its defeat in
CNET (June 7, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57588337-38/no-evidence-of-nsas-directaccess-to-tech-companies.
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. See, e.g., Peter Grier, Are Edward Snowden NSA Leaks Messing up U.S. Foreign Relations?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/DecoderBuzz/2013/0903/Are-Edward-Snowden-NSA-leaks-messing-up-US-foreign-relations.
110. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian & Richard A. Serrano, Snowden Leaks Severely Hurt U.S. Security, Two
House Members Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/09/nation/la-nasnowden-intel-20140110.
111. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
112. Charlie Savage, Broader Sifting Of Message Data By N.S.A. Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/broader-sifting-of-data-abroad-is-seen-bynsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.
113. Craig Timberg, The NSA Slide You Haven’t Seen, WASH. POST, July 10, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-haventseen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html. A study for the European
Parliament picked up on the term and concluded that the practice of “upstreaming” appears to be a
relatively widespread feature of surveillance by several EU member states. EUR. PARLIAMENT STUDY,
NATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES AND
THEIR
COMPATIBILITY
WITH
EU
LAW
19-20
(Oct.
2013),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493032/IPOLLIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf.
114. Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foilsmuch-internet-encryption.html?pagewanted=all.
115. Id.
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the key escrow and export control debates by finding new ways to exploit vast
amounts of encrypted online data. BULLRUN relied on a number of stealthy
methods ranging from the use of superfast computes to break codes, to allegedly
pressuring companies into handing over their master encryption keys or building in
backdoors, to introducing technical weaknesses covertly into commercial
encryption standards.116
Finally, in October, the Washington Post reported that the NSA “has secretly
broken into the main communications links that connect Yahoo and Google data
centers around the world.”117 Whereas PRISM apparently provided front-door
access to Yahoo and Google accounts through a court-approved process under
Section 702 of the FAA, this alternative program, called MUSCULAR, intercepted
Yahoo and Google data flows through the backdoor as they transited the
companies’ private fiber-optic networks.118 In public statements, the companies
expressed their “outrage”119 and, in the wake of these revelations, analysts
predicted that U.S. tech companies may lose as much as $180 billion by 2016 due
to international concerns about NSA’s spying.120
III. INDUSTRY RESPONSES AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
A. The Response to Snowden Revelations
The Snowden revelations have led to a wide variety of responses by different
actors affected by government access to data and communications processed by
cloud providers. Although this Section focuses primarily on the response of cloud
providers, it is useful to first consider the wider context by examining the responses
of a few selected groups such as security engineers, and the privacy advocacy and
human rights community.
Due to the repercussions for information security products and solutions,
members of the security engineering community have been particularly vocal in
their condemnation of the methods used to gain access to Internet data by
corrupting Internet security standards. This community has also played a major
role in interpreting and analyzing the technical aspects of the programs that were
revealed by Snowden and their implications for the privacy and security of

116. Id. In certain respects, however, BULLRUN is nothing new. For earlier discussion of how
governments in the post-9/11 era are increasingly dependent on the private sector to assist them in
collecting and analyzing data for national security purposes, see Jon D Michaels, Deputizing Homeland
Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008).
117. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowdendocuments-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Mathew J. Schwartz, NSA Surveillance Fallout Costs IT Industry Billions, INFORMATION WEEK
(Nov. 27, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/security/security-monitoring/nsasurveillance-fallout-costs-it-industry-billions/d/d-id/1112838.
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communications, providing input for the public debate.121
Edward Felten, a professor of computer science and public policy, and former
Chief Technologist for the Federal Trade Commission, noted that “[i]n security, the
worst case . . . is thinking you are secure when you’re not. And that’s exactly what
the NSA seems to be trying to perpetuate.”122 Bruce Schneier, a leading computer
security specialist who has written extensively about the Snowden documents,
echoed a broader sentiment in castigating the NSA for its “betrayal” of security
engineers and free and open nature of the Internet.123 Debates are already
underway within the IETF and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) on how
best to counter the threats of pervasive monitoring and are likely to result in new
and improved Internet security standards and practices.124
Privacy advocacy groups around the world have used the Snowden revelations
to intensify ongoing campaigns to limit government surveillance of Internet users.
First, these groups have filed a number of court cases in the U.S. and abroad,
including in the U.K., Germany, and the Netherlands.125 Within the international
human rights community, there are several new initiatives to strengthen safeguards
against government surveillance. For example, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights held an official hearing on the NSA’s mass surveillance
programs.126 Additionally, in July 2013, a broad international coalition of more
than four hundred human rights related NGOs finalized and signed the
International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications

121. See, e.g., Martín Abadi et al., An Open Letter from U.S. Researchers in Cryptography and
Information Security (Jan. 24, 2014) (available at http://masssurveillance.info/openletter.pdf); Ben
Adida et al., Technologists’ Comment to the Director of National Intelligence Review Group on
Intelligence
and
Communications
Technology
(Oct.
4,
2013)
(available
at
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/nsa-review-panel-tech-comment.pdf).
122. Ed Felten, NSA Apparently Undermining Standards, Security, Confidence, FREEDOM TO TINKER
(Sept. 9, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/nsa-apparently-undermining-standardssecurity-confidence.
123. Bruce Schneier, The U.S. Government Has Betrayed the Internet. We Need to Take it Back, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, 5:04 EST, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/
government-betrayed-Internet-nsa-spying.
124. See, e.g., Jari Arkko & Stephen Farrell, Security and Pervasive Monitoring, IETF (Sept. 7,
2013), https://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring. For the W3C, see A
W3C/IAB Workshop on Strengthening the Internet Against Pervasive Monitoring (STRINT)
Internet(Feb. 28—Mar. 1, 2014), WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/2014/
strint/report.html (last visited May 7, 2014).
125. In the United States, there have been several cases filed against the meta-data collection
program based on Section 215. See Spencer Ackerman & Dan Roberts, NSA Phone Surveillance
Program Likely Unconstitutional, Federal Judge Rules, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2013, 15:38 EST,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/nsa-phone-surveillance-likely-unconstitutional-judge.
For an overview of ongoing litigation about NSA surveillance, see Kara Brandeisky, NSA Surveillance
Lawsuit Tracker, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/surveillance-suits (last updated
Feb. 24, 2014). For a short overview and references to important cases in the wake of the Snowden
revelations in Europe, see Axel Arnbak, ECHR Fast-tracks Court Case on PRISM and TEMPORA (and
VERYANGRYBIRDS?),
FREEDOM
TO
TINKER
(Jan.
29,
2014),
https://freedom-totinker.com/blog/axel/echr-fast-tracks-court-case-on-prism-and-tempora-and-very-angry-birds.
126. Steven M. Watt, International Rights Body to Press U.S. on Surveillance, Snowden, ACLU
BLOG OF RTS. (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-human-rights/internationalrights-body-press-us-surveillance-snowden.
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Surveillance (“Principles”).127 The Principles condemn mass surveillance as a
human rights violation and assert and interpret accepted principles such as
proportionality, necessity, and transparency in the communications surveillance
context.128 Finally, a broad range of NGOs have joined forces in the Stop
Watching Us129 coalition and the more recent ‘Day We Fight Back.’130 The
international human rights community has also condemned the treatment of
Edward Snowden as a criminal rather than as a whistleblower and condemned
restrictions on the reporting of the leaked documents.131 In a recent report, Frank
La Rue, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right
to freedom of opinion and expression, analyzed the implications of mass
surveillance on the right to freedom of expression and the need for government
surveillance practices to comply with human rights standards.132
B. The Industry Response: Taking Care of Old Business
In a recent article, reporter Steven Levy nicely captures the general response of
Internet firms to the Snowden revelations by providing a look “inside their year
from hell.”133 Levy documents industry’s struggle to craft a proper response to the
uproar about direct government access to their servers (as alleged in the early
reports of PRISM) and reassure overseas customers in light of the unhelpful U.S.
government statements that NSA snooping was only directed at “non-American
citizens.”134 Industry had little success in quelling suspicion and regaining trust,
especially from foreign customers and governments. “Every time we spoke it
seemed to make matters worse . . . [w]e just were not believed,” explained one tech
executive to Levy.135
Quite apart from overcoming this atmosphere of general distrust, industry
players had enough on their hands in deciding on a practical response to the
Snowden troubles. Of the many possible technical measures aimed at restricting
undue access to online information and communication, the most obvious one for
them to consider was more extensive use of encryption. When properly
implemented by cloud providers, encryption measures can help secure
127. See International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications
Surveillance, NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE (July 10, 2013), https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/
text.
128. Id.
129. See STOP WATCHING US, https://optin.stopwatching.us (last visited May 7, 2014).
130. See THE DAY WE FIGHT BACK, https://thedaywefightback.org (last visited May 7, 2014).
131. See, e.g., USA Must Not Persecute Whistleblower Edward Snowden, AMNESTY INTERNAT’L
(July 2, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/usa-must-not-persecute-whistleblower-edwardsnowden-2013-07-02.
132. Frank La Rue issued a report just one day before the first Snowden leaks in June 2013. See
U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.
pdf.
133. Steven Levy, How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/.
134. See Tomio Geron, Mark Zuckerberg: U.S. Government 'Blew It' On NSA Issue, FORBES (Sept.
11, 2013, 7:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/11/live-mark-zuckerberg-speaksat-techcrunch-disrupt.
135. Levy, supra note 133.
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communications and stored data against third party intrusions, including those of
government intelligence agencies.136 At the very least, service providers could
deploy encryption protocols like TLS/SSL to secure client-server communications
between users and their own services.137 The MUSCULAR revelations suggest
that service providers could also encrypt data more comprehensively once it arrives
at their servers for processing or storage.138 Indeed, many of the measures
discussed in this Section are but old wine in new bottles: that is, prudent responses
to longstanding security risks that have been given greater urgency by the Snowden
revelations. If the cloud industry had taken information security more seriously
years ago, their services would have been less vulnerable in the first place.
Before turning to the specifics of the industry responses, it is worth briefly
observing that despite the value of encryption measures in hindering surveillance, it
has some limitations. In particular, as long as a service provider holds or has
access to its users’ encryption keys, it maintains the ability to access a user’s data
in unencrypted form, notwithstanding the fact that data travels between a client and
a server securely. Moreover, for encryption measures to be effective in preventing
backdoor access, industry must rely on cryptographic standards and
implementations that have not been corrupted and must keep encryption keys out of
the hands of government agencies. This may seem obvious, but achieving it is less
so. Recent revelations related to NSA efforts to undermine cryptographic standards
themselves are particularly worrying in this regard.139
In its discussion of what should be done to promote security and trust in
encryption technologies, the President’s Review Group implicitly rejected NSA
activities undermining encryption standards by recommending that the U.S.
Government should: “(1) fully support and not undermine efforts to create
encryption standards; (2) not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make
vulnerable generally available commercial software; and (3) increase the use of
encryption and urge US companies to do so, in order to better protect data in
transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.”140
While specific
implementations of encryption technologies may suffer from security weaknesses,
the use of encryption generally helps protect cloud data against interception by
third parties, including government agencies. In contrast, no encryption or weak

136. See supra Part II.
137. See id.; see also Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Backdoors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359 (2010).
138. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
139. After revelations about the corruption of the DUAL-EC standard by the NSA, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) responded by advising against the use of this standard.
See Office of the Dir., Cryptographic Standards Statement, NIST (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.nist.gov/director/cybersecuritystatement-091013.cfm. More recently, NIST launched a
review of its standards development process to address concerns about the security and integrity of
NIST cryptographic standards. See Computer Sec. Div., NIST Initiating Review of Cryptographic
Standards Development Process, NIST (Feb. 18, 2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto-review.
140. See REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at Recommendation 29. The Review Group has
been criticized for being vague in its factual review of NSA activities related to cryptographic standards
and software backdoors more generally. See Ed Felten, Software Backdoors and the White House NSA
Panel Report, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Dec. 19, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/softwarebackdoors-and-the-white-house-nsa-panel-report.
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encryption enables government agencies to access cloud data without having to
rely on legal process directed at cloud providers or the targeted interception of key
material.
1. Securing Communications between Users and Cloud Services
As recently as five years ago, most of the best known and free cloud services
failed to encrypt the communications channel they used to transmit data to and
from their users. As a result, anyone gaining access to this communication channel
could easily intercept private communications between the users and the service.
Nor was it difficult to gain access given the combination of readily available
interception software and insecure computing environments.141
More recently, many of the major web-based cloud providers have begun to
implement and enable by default standard encryption protocols, including the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), which has been pervasive in the field
of ecommerce and online banking for many years. The Snowden revelations and
the apparent massive collection of Internet communications content through
programs such as UPSTREAM clearly demonstrate the value of encrypted
communications between users and cloud providers. When implemented properly,
HTTPS ensures that the communications between the browser and the web-based
service are secure from third party access.142 The protocol achieves this in two
ways: first, it authenticates the identity of the service, and, second, it uses SSL/TLS
to encrypt the data that subsequently flows between a user and this service.143
Some services have taken additional steps to protect their users from government
surveillance by implementing protocols with “perfect forward secrecy,” which is a
property of certain encryption protocols that ensures that if an encryption key,
which, if is compromised, past messages with the user remain uncompromised.144
Cost is the main reason that service providers delayed adopting this industry
standard for cloud services. Browsers have long supported the use of secure
connections by users, but securing all the connections by default requires that cloud
services increase their server-side processing capacity. However, as market
dynamics are now beginning to show, the costs for such encryption measures are
not prohibitive. The transition of web-based cloud service providers to HTTPS by
default is now ongoing. Google, Microsoft and Facebook have already enabled

141. Shared Internet access points, such as in Internet cafes, are often insecure and security practices
of most users would clearly warrant the enabling of security by default. For a discussion of security
issues related to cloud services in 2009, see Ryan Singel, Encrypt the Cloud, Security Luminaries Tell
Google, WIRED (Jun. 16, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/google_ssl. The expert
letter discussed in the Singel article details a variety of security issues for users of Google’s cloud
services due to the absence of SSL by default. See Letter from Alessandro Acquisti et al., to Eric
Schmidt, CEO Google, Re: Ensuring Adequate Security in Google’s Cloud Based Services (June 2009)
(available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/06/google-letter-final2.pdf).
142. See DAVID GOURLEY ET AL., HTTP: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 202-10, 308 (Linda Mui, ed., 2002).
143. Id. at 308.
144. See Parker Higgins, Pushing for Perfect Forward Secrecy, an Important Web Privacy
Protection, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/pushingperfect-forward-secrecy-important-web-privacy-protection.
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HTTPS.145 One of the last major U.S. based web companies to respond to calls for
implementation of HTTPS by default is Yahoo, which announced plans to start
implementing it by early 2014.146
In terms of securing web-based communications, however, the HTTPS system
is no panacea against government surveillance. First, the protocol must be properly
implemented.147 Second, there are known attacks on the use of encrypted web
communications through SSL.148 Third, intelligence agencies may work around the
protections and attempt to secretly install software on the computers of targeted
users, thereby allowing them to capture their communications before they are
transmitted across an encrypted connection.149 Finally, and most importantly,
HTTPS is not designed to protect data at rest. Even if a cloud provider properly
implements this protocol, this does nothing to prevent a government agency from
obtaining the data it seeks by means of a compulsory order requiring the service
provider to furnish this data. Indeed, as Professor Peter Swire argues, the trend
towards encrypting data in transit between users and cloud services may well result
in governments shifting their attention from attacking the communication
infrastructure to demanding that cloud service providers hand over stored data after
it has been securely transmitted.150 The Snowden revelations already provide some
145. See, e.g., Sam Schillace, Gmail Engineering Director, Default HTTPS Access for Gmail,
OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/default-https-access-forgmail.html; Dick Craddock, Grp. Program Mgr. for Windows Live Hotmail, Hotmail Security Improves
with
Full-Session
HTTPS
Encryption,
THE WINDOWS BLOG
(Nov.
9,
2010),
http://blogs.windows.com/windows_live/b/windowslive/archive/2010/11/09/hotmail-security-improveswith-full-session-https-encryption.aspx; Dick Craddock, Grp. Program Mgr., Hotmail, An Update on
SSL Support, THE WINDOWS BLOG (July 7, 2011), http://blogs.windows.com/windows_live/b/
windowslive/archive/2011/07/07/an-update-on-ssl-support.aspx; Antone Gonsalves, Facebook Praised
For
Encrypting
Web
Access
By
Default,
CSO
ONLINE
(Nov.
20,
2012),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/721978/facebook-praised-for-encrypting-web-access-by-default.
146. See Liam Tung, Yahoo Finally Enables HTTPS Encryption for Email by Default, ZDNET (Jan.
8,
2014),
http://www.zdnet.com/yahoo-finally-enables-https-encryption-for-email-by-default7000024922.
147. There are a wide variety of security issues in the implementation phase of these protocols, a
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent example detailing problems
relating to the choices of large prima numbers in public key RSA cryptographic protocols, see Arjen K.
Lenstra et al., Ron was Wrong, Whit is Right, 2012 IACR CRYPTOLOGY EPRINT ARCHIVE 64 (2012),
available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Ivan Ristić, SSL Threat Model, BLOG: IVAN RISTIĆ (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/09/ssl-threat-model.html. See also Nevana Vratonjic et al., The
Inconvenient Truth about Web Certificates, WORKSHOP ON THE ECON. OF INFO. SEC. (2011),
http://weis2011.econinfosec.org/papers/The%20Inconvenient%20Truth%20about%20Web%20Certifica
tes.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of
Computers with Malware, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 12, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/
2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware (detailing an expansion by the NSA of its
ability to gain access and control over millions of computers worldwide). The NSA responded with a
public statement that the reports were inaccurate. See Press Release, Pub. Affairs Office, Nat’l Sec.
Agency, Statement in Response to Press Allegations (Mar. 13, 2014) (available at
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/2014_03_14_press_allegations_response.p
df).
150. Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 200 (2012).
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evidence of this shift and the measures detailed in this Section could accelerate this
trend.
To counter this trend, governments confronted with encrypted
communication channels could try to compel cloud providers to hand over their
encryption keys, enabling the continued effective interception over
telecommunications infrastructure (an option discussed further in Part IV).
2. Securing Information Flows Between Data Centers
The MUSCULAR revelations indicate that intelligence agencies are also
systematically gaining access to cloud data through the targeting of the
communications links between cloud provider data centers.151 Taken at face value,
MUSCULAR suggests that the NSA has engaged in efforts to circumvent online
security measures and surreptitiously collect customer data without serving legal
process either on cloud providers or directly on customers themselves. This does
not necessarily imply that programs like MUSCULAR have no basis in the law.
Rather, it seems likely that the NSA conducts this program under the terms of
Executive Order 12333,152 which is the principal governing authority for U.S.
intelligence activities outside the United States.153
Nevertheless, industry has reacted very negatively to the NSA’s use of
methods associated with the MUSCULAR program. For example, Google’s
General Counsel, David Drummond, stated that his company was “outraged at the
151. See supra Part II.
152. Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981). Exec. Order No. 12333 was amended in part by
Exec. Order No. 13284, 68 Fed. Reg. 3371 (Jan. 23, 2003), by Exec. Order No. 13355, 69 Fed. Reg.
53593 (Aug. 27, 2004), and further amended by Exec. Order No. 13470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30,
2008).
153. Exec. Order No. 12333 provides that “[t]imely, accurate, and insightful information about the
activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their
agents, is essential to the national security of the United States.” It declares that “special emphasis
should be given to detecting and countering” espionage, terrorism, and the development, possession,
proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction. The executive order directs that “such techniques
as electronic surveillance” may not be used “unless they are in accordance with procedures . . . approved
by the Attorney General” and that “[s]uch procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights
and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes.” Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R.
200 (1981). For a brief description of the (limited) privacy protections under Exec. Order No. 12333,
see REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at App. B (describing limitations on targeting, collection,
analysis, dissemination, and retention). It is an interesting question whether such activity is also lawful
under international law and it is quite possible that certain types of U.S. foreign intelligence gathering,
while permitted under U.S. law, could be unlawful in the foreign territory where they are conducted.
For a discussion, see Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2; Brown & Korff, supra note 6. The Snowden
revelations have reignited a debate about the extraterritorial scope of human rights treaties, a feature the
U.S. Government has resisted. See Beth van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L.
STUD. 20 (2014); Letters to the Editor, Letter to the Editor from Former Member of the Human Rights
Committee, Martin Scheinin, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 10, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/2014/03/10/lettereditor-martin-scheinin; Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 2: Interpreting
the ICCPR, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-humanrights-part-2-interpreting-the-iccpr; Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty
Applies to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/us-seems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-itsactions-abroad.html.
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lengths to which the government seems to have gone” to gain access to customers’
data.154 At the same time, Drummond viewed MUSCULAR as a “very logical
explanation” of the apparent discrepancy between the “massive amount of data”
NSA reportedly held and the “small amount of data” that Google and others in the
industry have been providing.155 Drummond’s response suggests dissatisfaction
with MUSCULAR, at least in part because it removes industry from the
government data gathering process. Rather, industry statements suggest that
government data access should respect a service provider’s organizational and
technical infrastructure. Similarly, Microsoft’s General Counsel, Brad Smith,
contends that, except in rare circumstances, government should access customer
data through the front door by serving legal process on the cloud service provider
or its customers.156 Based on the revelation of MUSCULAR and similar programs,
Smith stated that government snooping constitutes “an ‘advanced persistent threat,’
alongside sophisticated malware and cyber attacks.”157
It is hardly surprising, then, that cloud firms like Microsoft have started taking
steps to ensure that governments use legal process rather than “technological brute
force to access customer data.”158 Microsoft recently announced “a comprehensive
engineering effort to strengthen the encryption of customer data across [its]
networks and services.”159 This matches similar activity of Google, which had
started to encrypt data more comprehensively even before the specific revelations
about the MUSCULAR program.160 As a Google security engineer explained
shortly after these revelations, “the traffic shown in the [MUSCULAR] slides
below is now all encrypted and the work the NSA/GCHQ (U.K. Government
Communications Headquarters) staff did on understanding it, ruined.”161 Finally,
Yahoo has announced it will “[e]ncrypt all information that moves between [its]
data centers by the end of Q1 2014.”162 The encryption measures discussed above
could help the cloud industry to counteract programs like MUSCULAR and
UPSTREAM, which rely on the bulk collection of data by targeting communication
links and the telecommunications infrastructure. Of course, this assumes that the
NSA does not seek to undermine these protections by relying on security
weaknesses in the implementation or use of SSL or the underlying encryption
154. See Levy, supra note 133.
155. Id.
156. See Smith, supra note 2.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Craig Timberg, Google Encrypts Data Amid Backlash Against NSA Spying, WASH. POST,
Sept 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-encrypts-data-amidbacklash-against-nsa-spying/2013/09/06/9acc3c20-1722-11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef_story.html.
161. Mike
Hearn,
Posting
to
Google+,
GOOGLE+
(Nov.
5,
2013),
https://plus.google.com/+MikeHearn/posts/LW1DXJ2BK8k.
See also Jennifer Garnett, Google
Encrypts Its Network to Counteract NSA Surveillance, JOLT DIGEST (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/google-encrypts-its-network-to-counteract-nsa-surveillance.
See also Nicolas Lidzborski, Gmail Security Engineering, Staying at the Forefront of Email Security
and Reliability: HTTPS-Only and 99.978 Percent Availability, GOOGLE BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/staying-at-forefront-of-email-security.html?m=1.
162. Marissa Mayer, Our Commitment to Protecting Your Information, YAHOO (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://yahoo.tumblr.com/post/67373852814/our-commitment-to-protecting-your-information.
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algorithms.
3. Front-Door Access and Its Limitations
If the measures described in the preceding Section are effective, they may help
to push the intelligence community to seek access through the front door. In the
next Section, we will analyze to what extent the U.S. government may compel web
services to assist law enforcement and intelligence agencies in gaining access to
secure communications and what this implies about the efficacy of technical
countermeasures such as encryption. More generally, it is important to note that
there are multiple ways to gain lawful access to information in the cloud and no
clear legal rules with respect to which entity should be targeted (the clouds service,
the cloud customer, or the communications infrastructure that is used to connect
users and servers). In the absence of such rules, cloud services may rely on
technical and organizational measures to dissuade government agencies from
targeting the communications infrastructure in favor of a more direct approach to
the cloud service or the cloud customer. There are two clear reasons for industry to
have a strong preference against access through infrastructure not under its control.
First, it negatively affects the relationship with their customers if third parties can
gain access to data without the service provider’s knowledge and makes it hard to
give guarantees about potential access to data by third parties. Second, it would
mean that sensitive or valuable business data is accessible to others in the value
chain, who could try to use such access for competitive reasons.
But while backdoor access is problematic from the industry’s perspective, even
front-door access is not wholly satisfactory in terms of addressing the concerns of
foreign customers of U.S. cloud services. Most importantly, Section 702 of the
FAA authorizes front-door access to cloud computing services under rules that
offer reduced privacy protections to non-U.S. persons. Once a so-called selector
for the acquisition of foreign intelligence information has been internally approved
within NSA, “service providers are legally compelled to assist the government by
providing the relevant communications.”163 The differences in the safeguards
applicable to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons under the Section 702 program
have been well-documented.164 Crucially, the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to non-U.S. persons outside the U.S., which is clearly reflected in the language of
Section 702 itself.165
163. See NSA FISA REPORT supra note 15, at 5 (The “tasking under this authority takes place with
the knowledge of the service providers.”).
164. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE FINDINGS BY THE EU CO-CHAIRS OF THE AD HOC EU-US WORKING
GROUP ON DATA PROTECTION (Nov. 27, 2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-ondata-protection.pdf (commenting on differences such as a lower threshold for collecting of “foreign
intelligence” data; lack of targeting and minimization procedures with regard to overseas collection of
data of non-US persons; and lack of Fourth Amendment protection). See also LIBE COMMITTEE DRAFT
REPORT, supra note 17.
165. See, e.g., REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 11, at 153 (noting that “[i]f section 702 were
designed to intercept the communications of United States persons, it would clearly violate the Fourth
Amendment”). After analyzing Section 702, the Report concludes that “the United States should grant
greater privacy protection to non-United States persons than we do today.” Id. at 131. See also
generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990).
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It follows that foreign cloud customers, even after being reassured about
enhanced security against backdoor access to data, may still not find the shift to
cloud computing very attractive, given that they do not have access to optimal
protection due to current market conditions and offerings. It seems likely that as a
result of the transition to cloud computing, the storage and processing of digital
information will end up being handled by a relatively small number of players.
Eventually, it is this market concentration that could make cloud providers a
particularly attractive avenue for government surveillance. But when data of a U.S.
or non-U.S. cloud customer is sought from a cloud provider under Section 702 or
similar programs, it raises the possibility that foreign intelligence agencies may
gain access to the data of foreigners without their knowledge. This represents a
significant change in the status quo that organizational customers of cloud services
may be unwilling to accept. As mentioned, Microsoft recently asserted itself in this
debate. Specifically, it has stated the principle that lawful access should not take
place through the targeting of cloud providers but through the targeting of the
organizations themselves. According to Microsoft, government agencies should
“go directly to business customers or government customers for information or data
about one of their employees—just as they did before these customers moved to the
cloud—without undermining their investigation or national security.”166
This may seem like a sound principle from the perspective of both cloud
providers as well as their customers. Yet it remains to be seen whether government
agencies will respect it. Absent special circumstances, such as the journalistic
privilege or medical confidentiality, there are few general legal rules restricting
lawful access to data being held by third parties. In the absence of legal reforms,
however, industry has started to explore the technical and organizational solutions
for implementing this principle in practice.
C. Innovations in Cloud Security: Taking Care of New Business
This Section explores a number of more radical and comprehensive security
measures in response to government surveillance concerns. These measures differ
from those discussed in Part III.B in two important ways: First, whereas Part III.B
described techniques for preventing backdoor access, this Section explores
techniques that complicate front-door access as well, and, in some cases, make it
impossible or infeasible. Second, the measures discussed below embrace the
concept of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs).167
Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene, and Seda Gürses have recently analyzed a range of
PETs “specifically aimed at enabling individuals to engage in online activities free
from surveillance and interference.”168 They classify PETs into three categories.169

166. Smith, supra note 2.
167. See John J. Borking, & Charles D. Raab, Laws, PETs and Other Technologies for Privacy
Protection, 2001 J. INFO. L. & TECH., no. 1, available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/
elj/jilt/2001_1/borking (defining PETs as “a coherent system of ICT measures that protects privacy by
eliminating or reducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary and/or undesired processing of
personal data, all without losing the functionality of the information system”).
168. Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene, & Seda Gürses, Hero or Villain: The Data Controller in Privacy Law
and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 923, 924 (2013) (emphasis added).
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The first category covers PETs that require “active implementation” by a
centralized service provider.170 These PETs consist mainly in sophisticated
cryptographic protocols.171 They offer certain privacy guarantees with respect to
user information while blocking the service provider’s access to such information.
As Diaz points out, however, they only provide value to users to the extent that the
provider actively invests in privacy-enhancing architectures that integrate these
protocols into the service.172
The second category encompasses client-side PETs as unilaterally deployed by
the relatively small number of users who are ready, willing, and able to look after
their own privacy interests when interacting with service providers.173 These PETs
also include standalone encryption applications (like PGP) as well as browser addons that help maintain the confidentiality of web-based communications or permit
anonymous access to online services.174 These tools do not require any
implementation by service providers, although service providers have been known
to encourage or discourage their use.175
PETs in both of these two categories discussed above may involve what many
refer to as “end-to-end encryption” solutions because they provide continuous
protection of data as it makes its way from end-user to end-user, regardless of the
involvement of service providers.176 In particular, the client-side solutions are
designed to allow sender and receiver to rely on an untrusted and potentially
adversarial intermediary such as an ISP or a web-based email service.177 In
contrast, SSL/TLS only protects the data in transit between a user and a service
provider. Thus, without further measures, the receiving party has access and even
the possibility to tamper with a user’s data.
A third category discussed by Diaz et al. consists of collaborative applications
that dispense with the need for a centralized service provider operating the service
or holding a user’s data.178 All three categories are relevant to cloud security, but
169. More specifically, Diaz et al. define PETS as “technologies that address the privacy issues
raised by mass collection of data and its possible repurposing for conducting surveillance,” while
restricting “the scope of PETs to technologies designed to provide privacy protection from untrusted and
potentially adversarial data controllers.” Id. at 940.
170. Id. at 925.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1433-36
(2011) (estimating that most PETs have no more than a million users and discussing the reasons for the
lack of consumer demand).
174. Diaz et al., supra note 168, at 950-53.
175. See Zach Miners, End-To-End Encryption Needs to be Easier for Users Before Facebook
Embraces It, PCWORLD (Mar. 19, 2014, 4:51 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2109582/end-toend-encryption-needs-to-be-easier-for-users-before-facebook-embraces-it.html
(observing
that
Facebook’s reluctance is at least partially based on difficulties created for the user).
176. Id.
177. Diaz et al., supra note 168, at 950-53.
178. Id. at 954 (“Collaborative solutions are particularly important to achieve privacy protection from
traffic analysis.”). Traffic data includes the time, order, frequency, and volume of communications, as
well as the location and identities of the parties engaged in a communication. See DIFFIE & LANDAU,
supra note 57, at 92 (stating that traffic analysis seeks to interpret non-content attributes of
communications in order to gain intelligence). Thus, PETs in this third category aim to provide
communications anonymity, and the best known example is the Tor network, which has allows millions
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the first two categories (alone and in combination) are of particular interest for the
purposes of this Article.
1. The Prospect of Active Implementation of PETs by the Cloud Industry
PETs researchers have developed a variety of privacy-preserving technologies
based on advanced cryptographic protocols. These protocols allow a service
provider to operate a service “that takes as input private user information without
the controller [i.e., the service provider] becoming privy to such information.”179
In particular, researchers have designed smart metering systems and pay-as-youdrive tolling systems that meet these requirements.180 While these systems remain
in the design stage or early implementation stage, privacy-preserving identity
management systems are available from well-known enterprise software firms such
as IBM and Microsoft.181
In the context of web-based and cloud services, there are a number of known
solutions that can prevent access of service providers to the actual data of their
users. Specific examples include private information retrieval, searchable
encryption, and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).182 Private information
retrieval protocols make it possible for a service provider holding a searchable
database to allow and respond to queries on this database without gaining access to
the queries.183 Searchable encryption allows a service provider to provide query
results on encrypted data under its control while, neither learning the search terms
nor the results.184 Finally, FHE allows general computations over encrypted
data.185 In other words, it allows a service provider to store encrypted data on a
server, process this data without decrypting it, and send the encrypted results of any
computations to the client for decryption, thereby fully satisfying the privacy needs
of cloud customers.186 Not surprisingly, FHE is sometimes referred to as the Holy
Grail of crypto research.187
It is important to emphasize that adoption of the solutions discussed remains
low even though some of them are ready for use. There are a number of reasons

of users to anonymously browse the web and communicate with each other. Diaz et al., supra note 168,
at 954.
179. Diaz et al., supra note 168, at 944.
180. Id. at 944-48.
181. See Jan Camenisch, et al., Concepts and Languages for Privacy-Preserving Attribute-Based
Authentication, in POLICIES AND RESEARCH IN IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 34-35 (Simone Fischer-Hübner
et al., eds., 2013).
182. See MARTEN VAN DIJK & ARI JUELS, RSA LAB., ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
ALONE FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING CLOUD COMPUTING, available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/305.pdf
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
183. Benny Chor, Oded Goldreich, Eyal Kushilevitz, & Madhu Sudan, Private Information
Retrieval, 45 J. ACM 965, 966 (1998). These protocols need to be implemented by the service
providers themselves.
184. See Rafail Ostrovsky & William E. Skeith III, Private Searching on Streaming Data, 20 J.
CRYPTOLOGY 397, 398, 401-02 (2007).
185. See VAN DIJK & JUELS, supra note 182; see also Cloud Security & Cryptography, MICROSOFT
RESEARCH, http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/cryptocloud (last visited May 7, 2014).
186. VAN DIJK & JUELS, supra note 182.
187. Id.
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for this. First, some of these solutions, such as FHE, are at the very early stages of
development.188 If service provision is limited to the mere storage of data in the
cloud, it may be technically feasible for the service provider to anticipate and
organize for encryption under the control of cloud users. However, if the cloud
provider also has to perform processing operations on the encrypted data stored by
its customers, the implementation of privacy-preserving PETs in the cloud context
is far more challenging and may even be impossible for complex operations.189
Second, many cloud providers lack the incentive to adopt and further develop
PETs based on advanced cryptographic solutions that would prevent them from
having access to user data. The reasons are obvious: many business models in the
cloud industry depend on generating revenue based on access to customers’ data
(e.g., profiling users for purposes of serving them targeted ads).190 Thus, for many
cloud service providers, the costs of implementing these PETs (loss of profits)
outweigh the potential benefits (improved security and privacy guarantees for their
customers).191 Arguably, the new emphasis on security and privacy in the cloud in
response to the Snowden revelations might incentivize industry to consider
developing and adopting similar measures. Notwithstanding the current lack of
adoption, the point this Article seeks to emphasize is that if service providers were
to deploy such measures, it would interfere with lawful access requests to cloud
providers in some obvious ways. For example, a provider might simply be unable
to share unencrypted customer data with law enforcement or intelligence agencies
notwithstanding a lawful request for such access.192
2. Client-Side PETs and the Cloud: Perfection, Usability, and Uptake
A second category of PETs offers client-side solutions that are deployed by
users unilaterally to enhance their privacy while interacting with a central service
provider. This category includes various confidentiality tools for content that is
hosted or shared through a third-party service. For example, Mymail-Crypt, which
188. See VINOD VAIKUNTANATHAN, UNIV. OF TORONTO, COMPUTING BLINDFOLDED: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 1-3, http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~vinodv/FHEfocs-survey.pdf (last visited May 7, 2014).
189. VAN DIJK & JUELS, supra note 182 (describing the limitations of cryptography alone in ensuring
that cloud providers will protect the privacy of users by neither leaking their data nor using it in
themselves in an inappropriate manner). One direction in which industry is likely to innovate further is
in offering technical architectures for organizational cloud customers that would allow them to set
policies for the use and access to data stored and processed in the cloud on their behalf. The idea behind
such architectures is that they would enforce certain information privacy and security characteristics by
“binding” policies to data through the use of metadata-based architectures, which would subsequently
ensure that these policies dictate what can (or cannot) happen to the data in terms of access and
processing. For a detailed discussion, see Carolyn Nguyen et al., A User-Centered Approach to the
Data Dilemma: Context, Architecture, and Policy, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 227-42 (M.
Hildebrandt et al., eds., 2013). Similar architectures that enable significantly more control over the use
and access to data in a cloud environment have been proposed as a way forward in the context of W3C.
See, e.g., ALISSA COOPER & CULLEN JENNINGS, CISCO SYS., THE TRUST-TO-TRUST MODEL OF CLOUD
SERVICES (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.w3.org/2014/strint/papers/30.pdf.
190. See, e.g., Soghoian, supra note 137, at 378.
191. See Rubinstein, supra note 173, at 1417-18. These costs do not include the additional costs and
complexity of implementing some of these advanced protocols.
192. See also infra note 271 and accompanying text.
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implements GnuPGP for Gmail, allows Gmail users to encrypt and sign their
email.193 Similarly, Scramble!, which is a Firefox browser extension, allows users
to share encrypted messages through Facebook without giving Facebook access to
their data.194 In addition, there are several chat clients that integrate Off-theRecord (OTR) protocols, which provide strong encryption for instant messaging
applications.195 All of these client-side solutions allow users to ensure that nonunauthorized parties cannot gain access to their data or communications when
using a third-party service. In addition, they “provide protection from surveillance
by the [service provider] itself, who is no longer privy to content communicated by
a user.”196
What happens if the government serves a lawful request for the content of
communications on a service provider whose customers utilize a client-side PET
for encrypted email or chat? At best, the service providers may hand over
encrypted data but these PETs prevent it from furnishing unencrypted data. On the
other hand, the provider may fully comply with requests for traffic data unless the
user combines a client-side PET with a collaborative PET like Tor.197
Cloud providers’ attitudes to these client-side PETs are likely to remain
ambivalent. On the one hand, they may decide to block their use because they
interfere with their business model and desired uses of the service;198 on the other
hand, they may embrace PETs as proof of their good faith efforts to ensure
customer privacy in the cloud. By pointing out the possibility to adopt end-to-end
encryption solutions, companies could reassure users who are rightly worried about
the surveillance of their communications.199
Although the availability of encryption solutions may seem attractive for users,
they come with some well-documented downsides in terms of usability.200 As a
result, only dedicated or expert users tend to take advantage of them. In fact this is
another oft-cited reason for industry to shy away from promoting client-side
encryption solutions. In addition, the client-side approach to security tends to rely
193. My-Mail Crypt for Gmail, CHROME WEB STORE, https://chrome.google.com/webstore/
detail/mymail-crypt-for-gmail/jcaobjhdnlpmopmjhijplpjhlplfkhba?hl=en-US (last visited Mar. 26, 2014)
194. Filipe Beato et al., Scramble! Your Social Network Data, in PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES 211, 212 (Simone Fischer-Hübner & Nicholas Hopper eds., 2011).
195. Diaz et al., supra note 168, at 950-51, (“(OTR) protocols, provide content confidentiality,
perfect forward secrecy, and repudiability . . .”); id. at 951 (noting that Adium, Cryptocaty, Xabber, and
IM+ are a few examples of open source implementations of OTR protocols that work with instant
messaging clients).
196. Id. at 951.
197. In such cases, the service provider would have difficulty complying with a “pen register” order
as well. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Ben Woods, Mobile Operators Confirm Tor Block, ZDNET (Jan. 24, 2012, 16:38
GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/mobile-operators-confirm-tor-block-4010025282.
199. See, e.g., Miners, supra note 175 (citing Facebook’s Chief Security Officer Sullivan as
suggesting that “[i]f Facebook users want that type of security, there are some third-party apps they can
use to add end-to-end encryption to Facebook’s services,” and stating that “[a]t a minimum, we want to
support third-party initiatives”).
200. Usability is a major issue in the uptake and appropriate use of more secure services. See, e.g.,
ALMA WHITTEN & J.D. TYGAR, WHY JOHNNY CAN’T ENCRYPT: A USABILITY EVALUATION OF PGP 5.0,
available at http://www.gaudior.net/alma/johnny.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); see also Miners, supra
note 175.
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on the free or open source software model, in which developers release their source
code, thereby allowing the security community to review the code and determine
that the software is indeed secure. From an ordinary user’s perspective, this
substitutes trust in a group of security experts in lieu of trusting the third-party
services. Finally, it is true that the implementation of end-to-end encryption may
help to protect against third party access to raw data through the service provider.
From the perspective of managing information security more generally, however,
many organizations and individuals may prefer trusting a dedicated service
provider over having to rely on their own expertise.
Of course, the Snowden revelations may boost the adoption of end-to-end
encryption as a way of limiting the widely publicized systematic monitoring of
global Internet communications. Certainly, the NSA’s targeting of major cloud
service providers through programs like PRISM has spiked interest in end-to-end
encryption solutions, at least according to all the hoopla in the in the popular
press.201 For the moment, however, there seems to be only a small niche market for
services that cater to the demand for properly implemented end-to-end security, as
evidenced by services such as Lavabit,202 Hushmail,203 Silent Circle,204 and
Heml.is.205
The Lavabit webmail service is an especially interesting example because of
its ongoing legal battle with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Lavabit sought
to provide encrypted email services, while resolving the usability issues typical of
client-side solutions.206 The design involved a public-private key infrastructure
managed by Lavabit.207 As usual, each user was assigned a public key and a private
key.208 Whereas decentralized encrypted email standards such as OpenPGP require
users to manage keys themselves,209 Lavabit stored and organized the encryption
keys on behalf of its users.210 To prevent itself from having access to the private
keys of its users, Lavabit encrypted the private key with a password known only to
the user, which it did not store on its servers.211 In other words, Lavabit allowed
the user to log into the service over an encrypted SSL/TLS connection with a
201. See supra note 4.
202. Lavabit is an encrypted mails service which shut down in response to demands to hand over
customer data to federal prosecutors. See infra notes 206-213 and accompanying text.
203. About, HUSHMAIL, https://www.hushmail.com/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (describing
Hushmail as “a privacy-oriented email service with built-in encryption and no third-party advertising.”).
204. About Us, SILENT CIRCLE, https://silentcircle.com/web/aboutus(last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (“[A]
revolutionary peer-to-peer global platform of encrypted services for mobile devices that enable private
and secure voice, video, text and file transfer services.”).
205. HEML.IS, https://heml.is (last visited May 7, 2014); see also Siraj Datoo, Pirate Bay Co-founder
to Release Hemlis Encrypted Messaging App, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 10, 2013, 7:48 EDT,
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/10/pirate-bay-hemlis-encrypted-messaging-appencrypt.
206. For a critical discussion of the design of Lavabit, see Moxie Marlinspike, A Critique of Lavabit,
THOUGHTCRIME.ORG (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/lavabit-critique.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. J.
Callas
et
al.,
OpenPGP
Message
Format,
IETF
(Nov.
2007),
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt.
210. Marlinspike, supra note 206.
211. Id.
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normal password and then gave the user access to his or her decrypted email.
As a result of the design and it apparent focus on usability, the Lavabit system
had some obvious weaknesses, as compared to powerful adversaries, which have
been widely discussed in reaction to the Lavabit court case.212 In particular, anyone
gaining access to the unencrypted communications between a user and the service
would be able to retrieve the user’s password and decrypt all of the users’ email.
After law enforcement successfully obtained a court order requiring Lavabit to
hand over its private SSL key—thereby giving it access to the user’s password—
the owner of Lavabit decided to shut down the service in protest.213 It is to these
types of legal conflicts that we turn in the next Section.
IV. CLOSING BACKDOORS AND SHAPING FRONT-DOORS
When looking at the measures discussed in the previous Section, it becomes
clear that there are technical possibilities to design cloud services in ways that limit
the ability of cloud providers to access the data of their customers. This Article
takes the position that the ongoing discussions over cloud security and the
increased worries over transnational surveillance are likely to spur further
innovation and subsequent adoption of such solutions in the marketplace.
High-security demanding customers such as government agencies and
corporate and organizational users with particularly strict demands for information
security are likely to drive these market responses.214 Customers will insist upon
better guarantees of security and confidentiality and may refuse to do business with
popular, U.S.-based cloud services subject to far-reaching government surveillance
powers. Indeed, they may be barred from doing so under new proposals in Europe
and elsewhere requiring their citizens to rely on local cloud services.215 In the
market for individual users of cloud resources, there may generally be an
increasing demand for better security and privacy safeguards as a result of the
widely discussed examples of mass surveillance of online interactions and
communication. In addition, law and regulation may increasingly require that
certain types of disproportionate lawful access to cloud data be excluded if cloud
providers want unrestricted access to the market.
Are these measures likely to be effective against intelligence agencies with the
skills and resources of NSA or GCHQ? The answer depends on a variety of
factors, which will be discussed further in this Section. One thing is clear: the
range of technical solutions described in Part III is not binary, and recent
announcements of ‘NSA-proof’ services seem highly oversimplified.
A better way of framing this topic is to ask a series of more nuanced questions
as follows: First, can technological and organizational design of services help to
protect against backdoor access of data in the cloud? Second, and related, can the
212. See, e.g., Larry Seltzer, Lavabit Security Was a Facade Says Crypto Expert, ZDNET, (Nov. 7,
2013, 5:00 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/lavabit-security-was-a-facade-says-crypto-expert-7000022919.
213. See Spencer Ackerman, Lavabit Email Service Abruptly Shut Down Citing Government
Interference, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2013 2:58 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2013/aug/08/lavabit-email-shut-down-edward-snowden (noting that Lavabit shut down after refusing to
comply with a government surveillance request apparently targeting Edward Snowden).
214. See also Van Hoboken et al., supra note 2, at 35.
215. See supra note 10.

522

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

cloud industry help to prevent bulk and dragnet access to the data of their
customers? Third, to what extent can the technical and organizational design of
cloud services help to shape lawful access dynamics, such as where and how lawful
access takes place (i.e., which entity and in which geographical location)? And,
finally, to what extent can government agencies armed with surveillance orders
counter the design choices of industry players when new technologies undermine
lawful access to data in the cloud the government is seeking?
Based on the analysis outlined herein, the first question should be answered
positively. As cloud services roll out new security and encryption measures with
the goal of preventing bulk data collection by surreptitious means, this will
undoubtedly interfere with large scale intelligence gathering, such as the
interception of client-server and server-server data streams. Firms like Google,
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook have already begun to implement well-established
techniques such as TLS/SSL and perfect forward secrecy, just as various security
organizations have begun to review how they develop cryptographic standards.216
At the end of the day, the protection against backdoor access is also a matter of
resources, however. Certain technological solutions may prevent effective bulk
collection through specific intelligence programs, but intelligence agencies could in
turn deploy targeted intelligence operations to undo some of these protections
implemented by cloud services.
The second question, which concerns the possibility of cloud firms preventing
dragnet surveillance, cannot generally be answered affirmatively. Technological
design may have some impact on front-door collection but where surveillance
regimes like Section 702 of the FAA authorize large scale transnational
surveillance directed at cloud services, industry has limited options. It may oppose
orders in court,217 or it may take a public stance to the effect that certain types of
lawful access should not be legally permissible under current statutes and strive for
legal reforms that would enhance the privacy interests of cloud customers.218
The third question must be answered positively also, at least in theory.
Technological and organizational design of services can help to shape lawful
access dynamics and could be used precisely to do so. While few cloud services
have actively implemented privacy-preserving encryption protocols, there is reason
to believe that this is changing. As discussed in the previous section, both the
cloud industry and the Internet security engineering community have taken the first
216. See William Jackson, NSA's Reported Tampering Could Change How Crypto Standards are
Made, GCN (Nov. 4, 2013), http://gcn.com/Articles/2013/11/04/NIST-crypto-review.aspx?Page=2; see
also Dan Goodin, Stop Using NSA-Influenced Code in Our Products, RSA Tells Customers, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 19, 2013, 7:43 PM) http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influencecode-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers.
217. See Alex Wilhelm, Microsoft Is Challenging The US Government’s Use Of Search Warrants To
Access Data Stored Abroad, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/25/
microsoft-is-challenging-the-us-governments-use-of-search-warrants-to-access-data-stored-abroad;
Brian Byrne, Microsoft in Battle with US Government Over Bank Account Info Held in Ireland,
INDEPENDNET.IE (Apr. 28, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/microsoftin-battle-with-us-government-over-bank-account-info-held-in-ireland-30223329.html
218. See Craig Timberg, Tech Companies Urge Lawmakers to Reform NSA Programs, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/tech-companies-urge-lawmakersto-reform-nsa-programs/2013/10/31/f100ced6-4264-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html.
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steps towards implementing technical and organizational measures to shape the
lawful access dynamics induced by the use of their services and further innovations
may be anticipated. The extent to which local jurisdictions may force multinational
cloud service providers to comply with domestic laws notwithstanding these new
security measures remains a particularly hotly debated issue.219
The fourth question can be rephrased as follows: Where the deployment of
cloud services with new and/or improved security or cryptographic features limits
or undermines lawful access, do investigative agencies have the legal authority
under existing statutes to seek court orders compelling U.S. firms to modify their
services or the power to persuade firms to do so in order to facilitate surveillance?
More broadly, do U.S. firms (other than telephone carriers subject to CALEA) have
a free hand in modifying existing services, or designing new services, to make
them more resistant to programs like PRISM? Or may the United States
government rely on its surveillance powers to oversee the design of cloud services
to ensure that court-ordered access remains achievable as authorized by ECPA and
FISA?
All of these questions, especially the fourth question, received some attention
in 2007 when reports surfaced that Hushmail, an encrypted email service, had
handed over “12 CDs worth of e-mails from three Hushmail accounts” in response
to a court order.220 More recently, press coverage and blogosphere discussion
exploded when a federal district court authorized the FBI to install and use a “pen
trap” device regarding the email communications of a subscriber of Lavabit’s
secure and encrypted email service; that subscriber was widely presumed to be
Edward Snowden.221 The unsealed court records indicate that at a meeting in late
June between Lavabit’s founder, Ladar Levison, and the FBI, Levinson refused to
comply with the pen trap order.222 According to the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Neil MacBride, who was present at the meeting, it was not
clear whether Levison refused “because it was technically not feasible or difficult,
or because it was not consistent with his business practice in providing secure,

219. See Hoboken et al., supra note 2, at 9-10.
220. Ryan Singel, Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2007, 3:39
PM) http://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai (describing how the court order was obtained
through a mutual assistance treaty between the U.S. and Canada).
221. See supra note 198; see also Kevin Poulsen, Edward Snowden’s E-Mail Provider Defied FBI
Demands to Turn Over Crypto Keys, Documents Show, WIRED (Oct. 2, 2013, 5:27 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed (describing, on the basis of recently
unsealed court documents, how Lavabit was served “with a so-called ‘pen register’ order requiring it to
record, and provide the government with, the e-mail ‘from’ and ‘to’ lines on every e-mail, as well as the
IP address used to access” Snowden’s mailbox).
222. See Response of the United States in Opposition to Lavabit’s Motion to Quash Subpoena and
Motion for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records at 5-9, In the Matter of the United States Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register/Trap and Trace Device on an Electronic Email Account, No. 1:13 EC 297 (E.D.
Va. 2013); In the Matter of the Search and Seizure of Information Associated with [redacted] that is
Stored and Controlled at Premises Controlled by Lavabit LLC, No. 1:13 SW 522 (E.D. Va. 2013), In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 13-1 (E.D. Va. 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/801182-redacted-pleadings-exhibits-1-23.html (Exhibit 17) [hereinafter U.S. Response
Brief].
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encrypted e-mail service for his customers.”223 MacBride then filed a motion to
compel Lavabit to comply with the pen trap order, which also required that Lavabit
provide the government with any technical assistance required to implement the
order.224 Prior to a hearing on this motion, MacBride also (1) filed a motion for
civil contempt, requesting that Levison be fined a $1,000 for every day that he
refused to comply with the pen trap order; (2) obtained a grand jury subpoena
ordering Levinson to testify in front of the grand jury and bring with him the
encryption keys; and (3) obtained a search-and-seizure warrant authorizing law
enforcement to seize from Lavabit “‘all information necessary to decrypt
communications sent to or from [the account], including encryption keys and SSL
keys,’ and ‘all information necessary to decrypt data stored in or otherwise
associated with [the account].’”225
At first, Levinson refused to comply with the pen trap order, arguing that
handing over Lavabit’s SSL “master key,” would give the FBI access to the
encrypted communications of all of Lavabit’s customers, and not just the target of
its investigation.226 In a letter to the U.S. Attorney, Levinson conceded that “it
would be possible to capture the required data ourselves and provide it to the
FBI.”227 He then proposed to collect the data manually and send it to the FBI at the
end of the 60-day order as well as intermittently as his schedule permitted; the
government rejected this offer because it did not provide for real-time transmission
of the intercepted data as required by federal law.228 Finally, after the court issued a
contempt order against Levison, he handed over the SSL master key, but suspended
operations of Lavabit rather than, as he put it in a message posted to the Lavabit
web site, “become complicit in crimes against the American people.”229
As the sealed pleadings became available,230 many commentators responded
with outrage, characterizing the government’s demands for Lavabit’s encryption
keys as “oppressive and abusive”231 and a “pathetic tale.”232 In what follows, we

223. See Michael Phillips & Matt Buchanan, How Lavabit Melted Down, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 7,
2013, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/10/how-lavabit-edward-snowden-emailservice-melted-down.html.
224. See U.S. Response Brief, supra note 222.
225. Phillips & Buchanan, supra note 223 (quoting search-and-seizure warrant); see also U.S.
Response Brief, supra note 222.
226. Phillips & Buchanan, supra note 223. The SSL “master key” protected customer passwords as
they traveled from a customers’ computer to the Lavabit servers. Customers had to transmit their
passwords to Lavabit in order to log into the service and read their encrypted email. Thus, access to the
master key would allow the FBI to unlock the password of every Lavabit customers and gain access to
their email. Id.
227. U.S. Response Brief, supra note 222, at 8.
228. Id. Additionally, Levinson sought $2,000 in compensation for implementing the solution and an
addition $1,500 if he automated the log collection so as to provide data more frequently. Id. The
government questioned whether this request for compensation constituted “reasonable expenses” under
the statute. Id.
229. LAVABIT, http://lavabit.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (letter from Ladar Levison).
230. See Plaintiff’s Ex.1- 3, United States v. Lavabit, No. 1:13 EC297 (E.D. Va. 2013), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/801182-redacted-pleadings-exhibits-1-23.html.
231. Mike Masnick, Lavabit Case Shows Why We Need Tech Literate Judges, TECH DIRT (Oct. 16,
2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131015/16391524887/lavabit-case-shows-why-weneed-tech-literate-judges.shtml.
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analyze the relevant provision of ECPA and FISA requiring firms like Lavabit to
assist the government with the installation of pen trap and other surveillance
devices. Next, we compare and contrast these provisions with much broader
powers conferred by CALEA, at least as to telecommunications carriers. Finally,
we identify some guidelines for interpreting the government’s power to compel
technical assistance and apply them to a number of cases including Lavabit.
A. Technical Assistance Provisions: Statutory Language and Case Law
There are several provisions in ECPA and FISA requiring firms to provide
assistance in connection with court ordered interceptions,233 authorized requests for
the installation of pen registers,234 and authorized directives for acquisition under
Section 702 of the FAA, the FISA amendments.235 The language in all three of
these provisions is very similar. It requires that service providers and certain other
entities furnish “all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference”
with the services that the provider is providing to the targeted individual.236
What does “minimum of interference” mean? One of the few relevant cases is
a Ninth Circuit decision concluding that the FBI’s proposed surveillance of oral
communications within an automobile could not be completed with “a minimum of
interference” with the in-car system's operation because it required the use of a
passive listening feature that would have disabled other system services.237 While
the court declined to say how much interference this Section permitted, it did note
232. Scott H. Greenfield, The Lavabit Brief: Breadth-Taking, SIMPLE JUSTICE (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/10/11/the-lavabit-brief-breadth-taking. For a more skeptical view of
Lavabit’s arguments, see Orin Kerr, Lavabit Challenges Contempt Order in the Fourth Circuit: An
Analysis of Its Arguments, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:29 AM)
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/11/lavabit-challenges-contempt-order; Orin Kerr, A Few Thoughts on
the DOJ Brief in the Lavabit Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:25 AM)
http://www.volokh.com/2013/11/14/thoughts-doj-brief-lavabits-case. See also Ed Felten, A Court Order
is an Insider Attack, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Oct. 15, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/acourt-order-is-an-insider-attack.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012).
234. Id. § 3124(a).
235. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A) (2012).
236. The wording of Section 702 is slightly different in that it requires the service provider not act
“unobtrusively,” but rather “in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition.” See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a(h)(1)(A). In addition, all three provisions allow the service provider to seek compensation “for
reasonable expenses incurred in providing such facilities or assistance.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4), 3124(c);
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(2). In United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., the Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision directing a telephone company to assist the government with the installation of a pen register
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which confers authority on Article III courts to “issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977). The N.Y. Tel. Co. case was decided prior to the
enactment of ECPA and FISA, but is still cited in later cases for the proposition that the powers
conferred by the Act extend, under appropriate circumstances, to third parties “in a position to frustrate
the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice.” Id. at 174. For a discussion
of other cases that mention the All Writs Act in the context of surveillance orders, see Soghoian, supra
note 137, at 414-15.
237. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d 1132,
1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
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that “‘[a] minimum of interference’ at least precludes total incapacitation of a
service while interception is in progress. Put another way, eavesdropping is not
performed with a ‘minimum of interference’ if a service is completely shut down as
a result of the surveillance.”238 This is consistent with the general principle that “an
intercept order may not impose an undue burden on a company enlisted to aid the
government.”239 It also rejected the dissent’s alternative reading of 18 U.S.C. §
2518(4), according to which “even the complete shutdown of a service can
represent the minimum interference, so long as no lesser amount of interference
could satisfy the intercept order.”240
An analysis of the differences between the technical assistance provisions in
ECPA and FISA, on the one hand, and CALEA on the other, lends further support
to the Ninth Circuit’s view of “minimum of interference” as something
(considerably) less than total incapacitation of a service. CALEA’s intent was to
preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance
involving digital telephony.241 This law requires telecommunications carriers and
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment to design their equipment,
facilities, and services to ensure that a required level of surveillance capabilities is
achieved.242 Telecommunications providers must be able to isolate and intercept
electronic communications and deliver them to law enforcement personnel.243
CALEA also contains three important limits. First, CALEA does not apply to
“information services,” such as e-mail and Internet access.244 Second, carriers are
only responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt any
communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, if they provide the
encryption service and possess the information necessary to decrypt the
communication.245 Third, carriers must “facilitat[e] authorized communications
interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a
minimum of interference with any subscriber’s telecommunications service and in
a manner that protects . . . the privacy and security of communications and callidentifying information not authorized to be intercepted.”246
Although this third requirement superficially resembles the “minimum of
238. Id. at 1145 (emphasis in original).
239. Id. at 1148 (citing N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172). In N.Y. Tel. Co., the Court upheld an order,
under the All Writs Act, compelling the phone company to install a pen register where compliance with
the order required “minimal effort on the part of the Company and no disruption to its operations.” 434
U.S. at 175.
240. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of Oral Commc'ns, 349 F.3d at 1148. It
is not clear if this holding is limited to ECPA and would not apply to a Section 702 order under FISA.
For a more pessimistic reading of this case, see Soghoian, supra note 137, at 404 (“While the Ninth
Circuit’s decision protected customer privacy in this particular case, the court left a clear path for
compelled assistance with covert surveillance if doing so does not hinder a company’s ability to provide
service to its customers. If anything, this rather hollow victory for the privacy community was actually a
win for the government”).
241. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827(I), at 22 (1994) (CALEA was designed to provide “law enforcement
no more and no less access to information than it had in the past”).
242. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(a). “Information services” are defined at 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6).
245. Id. § 1002(b)(3).
246. Id. § 1002(a)(4)(A).
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interference” condition in ECPA and FISA, in fact, it is radically different.
CALEA includes an enforcement provision under which the court issuing a
surveillance order may not only direct the carrier to comply with the order but also
direct that a provider of support services to the carrier or the manufacturer “furnish
forthwith modifications necessary for the carrier to comply.”247 This language is
far more expansive than anything in the trio of “technical assistance” provisions
examined above. Under CALEA, carriers must design services that both comply
with authorized governmental surveillance requests and do so in a manner that
avoids disrupting the service, and if they fail to build-in surveillance capabilities of
the appropriate kind, a court may order them to modify the service to achieve
compliance.248
In sharp contrast, information services are not subject to any such obligations
under CALEA nor does this law confer any power on courts to order modifications
to information services that may be needed to ensure compliance. Do courts enjoy
such powers under ECPA or FISA? Presumably, they do not. Both statues are
quite specific in their grants of authority and in their description of the conditions
under which a provider (including various Internet services) may be asked to
provide information, facilities, or technical assistance. While Congress has
modified ECPA and FISA several times since enacting CALEA, it has not
extended CALEA to information services, nor has it extended 18 U.S.C.§ 2522(a)
to entities other than telecommunication carriers regulated by CALEA. In the
absence of these affirmative steps, the obligations on Internet firms to provide
information, facilities, or technical assistance subject to the “minimum of
interference” condition in ECPA and FISA must be distinguishable (and less
onerous) than the corresponding obligations of telecommunications carriers under
CALEA.249
B. Applying the Analysis to Three Scenarios
In light of the analysis in Part IV.A, we may now consider three common
scenarios in which the government may demand that a service provider furnish
information, facilities, or technical assistance with a minimum of interference to its
service. The three scenarios involve: first, services subject to CALEA; second,
services outside of CAELA’s scope and that may or may not have designed their
own technical solutions for complying with surveillance orders; and, third, services
not subject to CALEA that encrypt their customers’ communications as part of the
service. In each case, we try to determine the extent to which a service provider
must modify the service, its features, or configuration, in order to comply with an
authorized surveillance order under ECPA or FISA.
The first scenario is straightforward: if the service is considered a
telecommunications carrier under CALEA, then it must ensure that law
enforcement officials can intercept communications on its network. But even
CALEA does not authorize law enforcement agencies to require any specific
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2522(a) (2012).
248. See id. §§ 2522(a)-(c).
249. This past spring, law enforcement officials revived earlier calls for expanding CALEA to a
wider range of Internet services. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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design features or system configurations, nor does it prohibit the adoption of any
feature or system configurations; rather, it leaves the design decisions to the
discretion of the regulated services.250 Moreover, CALEA only requires support
for decryption where “the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier
possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”251 In contrast,
the service provider is not responsible for “decrypting, or ensuring the
government's ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or
customer.”252 If, on the other hand, the service provider is an “information service”
and, therefore, not subject to CALEA, then it has no obligation to design
surveillance-ready services or to design features and system configurations, or to
refrain from offering unbreakable encryption, subject to FBI oversight and
approval.253
The second scenario is more complicated. If an information service not
regulated by CALEA receives an authorized assistance order, and compliance with
an assistance order entails minimal effort because the company regularly engages
in similar activities on its own network for business purposes (such as routine
maintenance, detecting and preventing fraud, security, or dispute resolution), then
the company has limited basis to object to furnishing assistance. For example,
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo provide web-based email services to hundreds of
millions of customers in multiple countries and languages. Suppose that any of
these companies developed a capability to clone customers’ mailboxes for
troubleshooting or security purposes (i.e., make a complete copy of a live mailbox
that is configured in the same way and sends and receives all of the same messages
as the original but does not in any way interfere with its functionality). The
company receives an order to hand over all email content for a few named accounts
and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4), the FBI seeks its technical assistance in
cloning the relevant mailboxes. The company would have little basis for refusing
to assist the FBI by cloning the mailboxes for the simple reason that under these
circumstances the “minimum of interference” condition is surely met.
Moreover, if the company lacked this capability or refused to develop its own
solution, the FBI’s first resort would be a court order requiring the service provider
to install the FBI’s own surveillance tools. Towards the end of the 1990’s, the FBI
developed a number of such tools including a program code-named Carnivore,254
which came to light when EarthLink refused to install the device.255 Carnivore is a
“packet-sniffer” (i.e., a program that records and analyzes network traffic) and it
could be “configured for full wiretap or pen register mode; in the latter, the data
content was ‘X-ed’ out.”256 In 2000, EarthLink was served with a pen register
order and told by the government that it wished to install a device on EarthLink’s
250. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(b)(1)(A), (B) (2012).
251. Id. § 1002(b)(3).
252. Id.
253. See id. § 1002(b)(2)(a).
254. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 269.
255. See Nick Wingfield, Ted Bridis, & Neil King, Jr., EarthLink Says It Refuses to Install FBI's
Carnivore
Surveillance
Device,
WALL ST. J.
(July
14,
2000,
12:01
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB963523417716552926.
256. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 57, at 269.
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network called “EtherPeek” to carry out the order.257 The company objected on
two grounds: first, that doing so would threaten the privacy of its subscribers
(because the device allowed the FBI to view the content and header information for
all email messages, which exceeded the terms of the order); and, second, that
enabling remote access to its network opened up a security hole that might be
exploited by others.258 EarthLink then designed its own software solution to
comply with the order but the government was dissatisfied and sought to install a
different program called Carnivore.259 EarthLink opposed this and went to court,
where a federal magistrate ruled against it, forcing EarthLink to install the
Carnivore device.260 At some point, Carnivore disrupted services for EarthLink’s
customers by crashing its remote access servers;261 however, the magistrate’s
decision did not address these facts, nor did it consider the “minimum of
interference” requirement under Section 2518(4).262 According to attorney Robert
Corn-Revere, who represented Earthlink in the aforementioned litigation,
EarthLink and the government eventually reached “an accommodation in which the
device was installed and further assurances were made about network security and
about protecting the privacy of subscribers generally.”263
In short, if a service provider lacks a technical solution to comply with an
interception or pen register order to provide the government with requested
information, it seems that courts will issue appropriate orders allowing the
government to install its own surveillance software inside the service provider’s
network.264 As a result, any large service provider with the technical and financial
wherewithal to build its own solution has a strong incentive to do so given that (1)
it is likely to work better than the FBI’s; (2) neither disrupts the service, nor opens
a security hole; and (3) minimizes government intrusion on customer privacy.
257. See The Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2nd sess. (Apr. 6, 2000) (statement of Robert CornRevere, former Earthlink attorney), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
judiciary/hju66503.000/hju66503_0f.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Corn-Revere]. See also Ann
Harrison, EarthLink: FBI Won't Monitor Our Network, COMPUTERWORLD (July 18, 2000, 12:01 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/5865/earthlink_fbi_won_t_monitor_our_network.
258. See Harrison, supra note 257.
259. See CHARLES P. PFLEEGER & SHARI LAWRENCE, SECURITY IN COMPUTING 599 (3d ed. 2003).
260. See Wingfield et. al, supra note 255; Testimony of Corn-Revere, supra, note 257.
261. Wingfield et. al, supra note 255 (“The FBI connected Carnivore . . . to EarthLink's remote
access servers . . .. But Carnivore wasn't compatible with the operating system software on the remote
access servers. So EarthLink had to install an older version of the system software that would work with
Carnivore . . .. [This] caused its remote access servers to crash, which in turn knocked out access for a
number of its customers”).
262. See In re United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register &
Trap & Trace Device, Cr. No. 99-2713M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2000) (McMahon, Mag. J.), available at
http:// www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/cd_cal_order.html. Although Congress inserted “technical
assistance” language into the Wiretap Act in 1970, it did not add this language to the Pen Register Act
until 2001, almost seven months after the order in the Earthlink case. See Pub. L. 107–56, § 225, 115
Stat. 292, 296 (2001)
263. Testimony of Corn-Revere, supra note 257.
264. The FBI eventually re-named Carnivore “DCS 1000” and has continued to invest heavily in
improving and expanding this technology. See Ryan Singel, Point, Click ... Eavesdrop: How the FBI
Wiretap Net Operates, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/
news/2007/08/wiretap.
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The third, and final, scenario is even more complex because it involves
encryption, which is a method for hiding information from unintended recipients
including law enforcement and national security. Lavabit is a highly relevant case
in point because it illustrates an underlying ambiguity in the “minimum of
interference” condition. As previously discussed, Lavabit offered secure email
with advanced encryption features.265 When the government sought information on
one of its customers, Lavabit refused to comply. It argued that handing over its
SSL master key would expose all of the mail sent or received by its customers to
the prying eyes of the government, and therefore violated Lavabit’s promise of
security via encryption, forcing it to shut down its business entirely.266 Yet, as
Lavabit later confirmed, it could assist the FBI in installing a pen-trap device and
providing access to the requested information in unencrypted form without
disrupting its service.267
This tension between Lavabit’s promise of security on the one hand, and its
ability to assist the government despite this promise on the other, raises an
interesting question with some troubling implications. The question is this: if a
firm such as Lavabit designs a secure email service that does not ordinarily enable
the government to monitor all of its customers’ communications, can the
government circumvent this assurance by means of a surveillance order supported
by a grand jury subpoena for its encryption keys? Orin Kerr, a leading expert on
surveillance law, suggests that Lavabit’s claim that its business model somehow
trumps the government’s power to conduct surveillance authorized by the Pen
Register Act is a “really weak argument.”268 As Kerr suggests, it makes little sense
to view a subpoena as oppressive or unduly burdensome merely because it allows
the government “to conduct the surveillance it is allowed to conduct under the Pen
Register statute.”269
Kerr’s view may prevail but it neglects the broader implications of rejecting
Lavabit’s argument, namely, that it incentivizes services like Lavabit to design
secure email systems so that it is not merely burdensome, embarrassing, and
economically injurious to comply with surveillance orders but infeasible, in the
very strong sense of being technologically impossible to do so. Ed Felten makes
this point by comparing a court order to any other “insider attack” (i.e., an attack in
which an employee “copies user data and gives it to an outside party”) and
suggesting that there are good reasons for services like Lavabit to design their
systems to protect against such attacks.270 According to Felten,
In the end, what led to Lavabit’s shutdown was not that the company’s
technology was too resistant to insider attacks, but that it wasn’t resistant. . . . Had
265. See supra notes 221-232.
266. See Ackerman, supra note 213 and accompanying text.
267. See U.S. Response Brief, supra note 222 and accompanying text.
268. Orin Kerr, Lavabit Challenges Contempt Order in the Fourth Circuit: An Analysis of Its
Arguments, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:29 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/
11/lavabit-challenges-contempt-order.
269. Id. Kerr supports his objection by citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) for
the proposition that “[c]itizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas[,]”
even though the duty to testify “may on occasion be burdensome and even embarrassing” and “may
cause injury to a witness’ social and economic status.” Id.
270. See Felten, surpa note 232.
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Lavabit had in place measures to prevent disclosure of its master key, it would have
been unable to comply with the ultimate court order—and it would have also been
safe against a rogue employee turning over its master key to bad actors.271
However the Lavabit case may be resolved,272 it sets up the far more difficult
question of whether ECPA or FISA authorize a court to order a service provider not
only to disclose a master SSL key, even though doing so violates customer
assurances and may force it to shut down its service, but also to subvert the design
of its service by installing malware on a target’s computer.
This may (or may not) be an accurate description of what happened in the
Hushmail case.273 Hushmail secure email service offers its customers two options:
a high-security option, which requires that users install and run a Java-based
encryption applet and encrypts and decrypts email only on the customer’s
computer; and a low-security (non-Java) option, which is more convenient but less
secure because it handles encryption and decryption on Hushmail’s web server.274
As a result, Hushmail retains the ability to decrypt user’s emails when they select
the low-security option (via an “insider attack” like that against Lavabit) but no
ability to do so when the customer selects the high-security option.275 Of course,
Hushmail’s design does not prevent the company from modifying the Java applet
so that it captures the user’s passphrase and sends it to Hushmail, thereby enabling
the company to decrypt the email and share it with a third-party including the
government. But it seems unlikely that the company would destroy its own
business by subverting its software in this way and subject itself to a likely
deceptive practice enforcement action under Section 5 of the FTC Act.276 Unlike
Lavabit, none of the sealed documents in the Hushmail case have been leaked, so
less information is available. Also, it is not clear whether the 2007 court order
pertained to a high-security or a low-security user; or if Hushmail modified its Java
encryption engine; or if, in the interests of full disclosure, it merely pointed out the
possibility of doing so.277 In short, the Hushmail case exemplifies the dilemmas
that the government may begin to face if service providers take the next logical step
of adding government agencies to their threat models and designing systems that
protect against valid court orders. And while the government has prevailed in its
efforts to force niche players like Lavabit and Hushmail to capitulate, it may face a
much greater challenge if major Internet firms like Microsoft, Google, and
Facebook go down this path in response to the Snowden revelations.

271. Id.
272. As of this writing, the Fourth Circuit has issued an opinion that affirms the lower court decision
on procedural grounds. See United States v. Lavabit, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7112, *44-45 (4th
Cir. Va. Apr. 16, 2014) (noting that Lavabit waived its appellate arguments by failing to raise them in
the district court).
273. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
274. Id. For additional technical details, see Martin Brinkmann, Hushmail: Why You Should Run the
Java Version, GHACKS.NET (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.ghacks.net/2013/08/09/hushmail-why-youshould-run-the-java-version.
275. Brinkmann, supra note 274.
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (2012).
277. See Singel, supra note 220 (noting that a savvy user might detect this modification).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article describes and places in a legal perspective the cloud industry’s
technological responses to the revelations about ongoing transnational surveillance.
By focusing on industry responses and exploring the ways in which the
technological design of cloud services could further address surveillance concerns,
we provide insights into the prospects of these services shaping lawful government
access to the cloud. This intersection of service design, on the one hand, and
government demands for access to data, on the other hand, signals a dynamic new
chapter in the ongoing debate between industry and governments about the
possibility and conditions of secure and privacy-friendly information and
communications technologies (ICTs) for global markets.
In particular, we have shown that it is helpful to distinguish between front-door
and backdoor access to data in the cloud. Our analysis of industry responses has
shown the cloud industry is moving quickly to address interception of their
customers’ data without their knowledge or involvement by adopting technological
solutions that limit lawful access (as far as possible) to legal processes directed at
the cloud service itself and/or its customers. Many of these measures could have
been implemented much earlier on. They are now becoming industry norms.
Industry standards like SSL/TLS and HTTPS, together with a new generation of
PETs offering “end-to-end” protection, can be effective tools in preventing bulk
acquisition through the targeting of the worldwide communications infrastructure.
In short, technologies can help the industry shape lawful access even though
they do not change the legal framework, nor do they overcome the lack of progress
in reforming existing legal authorities (such as Section 702 of the FAA) to confine
lawful access to the front-door of service providers. We expect that this lack of
progress—with respect to transnational legal guarantees of privacy and information
security, not only in the U.S. but also elsewhere—will be a strong driver for the
wider adoption of more robust and comprehensive privacy technologies in the
cloud service context. And we argue that under current conditions, the U.S. cloud
industry will increasingly rely on technologies to ‘regulate’ government data access
in an effort to enhance the privacy and information security protections of their
foreign customers.
This raises the pertinent question of how the U.S. government may respond to
increased resilience of cloud services against lawful surveillance. While FISA and
ECPA allow government agencies to obtain orders that ensure the cooperation of
providers notwithstanding strong technological protections, existing law does not
allow for unlimited bargaining room. Most of the services in question are not
subject to CALEA obligations and an extension of CALEA seems neither
warranted nor politically feasible under present conditions. Moreover, most of
these services have responded to the Snowden revelations by implementing
stronger privacy protections (and even some advanced cryptographic protocols).
No doubt they await the outcome of the ongoing litigation in the Lavabit case,
which may clarify the government’s power to compel a service to break its security
model in response to a valid surveillance order. However, the Lavabit case does
not yet present a scenario in which a service’s use of advanced cryptography makes
it impossible to comply with a surveillance order by furnishing unencrypted data.
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A U.S. government win in the Lavabit case may therefore be little more than a
pyrrhic victory, for it could simply further incentivize industry to adopt even
stronger technological solutions against surveillance, including both actively
implemented and client-side encryption protocols preserving privacy in the cloud.

